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Introduction
When Brown v. Board of Education' was first delivered few, least of
all the Supreme Court, saw the administrative problems that lay ahead.
It was assumed most school districts would promptly dismantle their
segregated school systems. For those that needed encouragement the
district courts, it was believed, could in their role as equity courts give
whatever help was needed.
The second Brown v. Board of Education2 case outlined briefly the
approach anticipated. Realizing the impossibility of supervising the tran-
sition itself, the Supreme Court declined to issue any decree and in-
stead remanded each case to the appropriate federal or state court,
instructing it to write the required order. The Supreme Court left no
doubt that the local courts should go into every aspect of
problems related to administration, arising from the physical con-
dition of the school plant, the school transportation system, per-
sonnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into com-
pact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the
public schools on a non-racial basis .... 3
The Supreme Court thus anticipated that each district court, utilizing
the wide powers available to it as an equity court, would declare itself
a temporary school board and rule on all details of the desegregation
process.
The rarefied air on which the easy assumptions of Brown II floated,
however, proved unrealistic and serious threats to the orderly enforce-
* This student Comment was awarded the Benjamin Scharps Prize for 1967, given for
the most outstanding piece of faculty-designated student work.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 549 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Brown I].
3. Id. at 00-01.
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ment of the law were encountered. After a decade only 2.3 per cent of
Southern Negro children were attending desegregated schools.4
Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights Act of 19646 in the
hope that administrative efforts might succeed where the courts had
failed. Title VI provides in part that
no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.0
Every federal agency is instructed to act to implement this pro-
nouncement. If discriminatory practices continue, the government
agency may under Section 602 order "the termination of or refusal to
grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity .... ."
Title VI) in short, required the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) to assume responsibility for seeing that every school in
the United States was desegregated, It was given as a sanction the right
to terminate federal aid to any school district that failed to cooperate.
The Act thus meant that henceforth there would be two govern-
mental bodies charged with the common task of enforcing the 14th
Amendment ban against segregation in public schools. This Comment
will examine the nature of the accommodation that has developed be-
tween the courts and HEW.8
I. The Office of Education's Attitude Toward the Courts
A. The Exception for Court Orders
For the Office of Education the presence of courts posed the obvious
and immediate question whether the government should accept a court
order as adequate proof that a school district was desegregating and
therefore eligible for federal aid, or whether it should insist that such
districts conform to any standard the agency itself might formulate.
4. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1966, at 16, col. 4.
5. Pub. L. 88-352; 75 Stat. 241 (164).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.7. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
8. Because such is the inquiry, this paper is not an attempt to assess generally the great
contribution Title VI has obviously made to school desegregation in the South. Nor is the
paper intended to be a general description of the substantive and procedural standards
developed by the Office of Edtication, their judicial origins and the administrative prob.
lems they have created. While these are equally important questions, they are at least
in part separate ones. For articles discussing such issues see Note, School Desegregation
and the Office of Education Guidelines, 55 GEo. LJ. 325 (1966); Dunn, Title YI, the
Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. R v. 42 (1967).
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The regulations drafted by HEW pursuait to Title VI state dearly
the government's solution to the problem:
The requirements of paragraph (a) or (b) of this section with re-
spect to any elementary or secondary school or school system shall
be deemed to be satisfied if such school or school system (1) is sub-ject to a final order of a court of the United States for the desegre-
gation of such school or school system, and provides an assurance
that it will comply with such order, including any future modifi-
cation of such order .... 9
Nothing on the face of Title VI itself required the government to
make such an exception. There is only the most inconclusive legisla-
tive history to suggest, furthermore, that Congress meant the exception
to be read into the statute. Some senators thought all court orders
would satisfy the compliance requirement under Title VI; some
thought that the agencies would administer the Act in good faith and
accept any court orders which were reasonable; some thought court
orders were irrelevant to Title VI.10 The Senate debate does suggest,
though, that the Justice Department committed the government to an
interpretation of the bill that would require acceptance of court orders
and that the bill was passed by the Senate with knowledge of that prior
commitment."1
Several lower federal court opinions have implied that the Constitu-
tion itself requires such a regulation. In Lee v. Macon County Board
of Education the court stated that HEW could not cut off funds from
a school district subject to a court order:
[J]udicial approval of a plan of desegregation... establishes eli-
gibility for federal aid. In such instances, the Executive officials,
acting through the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
9. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(c)(1) (1967).
10. Senator Pastore was asked from the floor whether funds vould be cut off despite
the fact that the school district was under a court order requiring "4, 5, 6 or 8 years to
complete desegregation." His answer was "I shall not say for 5 or 6 years. That is too
long a time. I do not see why we have to wait 5 or 6 years to desegregate." 110 Co..
Rc 14,426 (1964). There are further vague allusions to the belief that court orders would
be respected and to the hope that the debate would create legislative history on the ques-
tion. 110 CoNG. Rc. 14,437-39 (1964). Such statements were characterized by an opponent
of the bill as simply expressing the hope "that the bill we are about to pass will not be
enforced." 110 CONG. Rac. 14,439 (1954) (remarks of Senator Gore).
11. Senator Humphrey, in charge of the bill in the Senate, stated during debate: "I
have studied the question raised... for long hours and have consulted many officials
of our government. It is my view that Title VI would not be used for action terminating,
reducing, or refusing assistance in such a case as has been mentioned because of dissatis.
faction with the terms of the applicable court order or the speed with which It directs
desegregation procedure." 110 CONG. REc. 14,436 (1964). Humphrey's statement appears in
large part to represent simply a report on the Justice Department's initial interpretation
of the pending legislation rather than a statement of legislative intent itself
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fare or any other branch of the government, may not, by terminat-
ing funds, in effect disapprove a court-adopted plan.12
This statement amounts only to dictum, since the question actually
before the court was whether alleged non-compliance with a court or-
der justified the termination of funds by HEW.
The court assumes that Title VI and the standards promulgated
under it may incorporate only constitutional requirements. To the ex-
tent this is a valid assumption, juxtaposition of the agency's view of
what the Constitution requires on top of a judicial determination of
the same question certainly would appear to violate the ban on execu-
tive review of judicial decisions first enunciated in Hayburn's Case.13
The court's assumption that Title VI only empowers HEW to re-
quire what the Constitution does is not beyond debate. While HEW
equates Title VI standards with those imposed by the Constitution, at
least in the absence of a clear ruling by an appellate court, there is the
possibility that HEW will argue that this is done only as a matter of
policy rather than statutory necessity.' 4 Consequently, the exception
for court orders could also be viewed as a matter of administrative dis-
cretion rather than of legislative or constitutional fiat.15
A situation in which the courts and the Office of Education would
both demand that a school district take certain specific steps to desegre-
gate raised the possibility in the minds of some officials that a school
12. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 270 F. Supp. 859, 865 (M.D. Ala. 1967). The
opinion also cites Alabama NAACP State Conference of Branches v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp.
346, 352 (M.D. Ala. 1967): "As courts attempt to cooperate with executive and legislative
policies, so, too, the Department must respect a court order for the desegregation of a
school or school system."
13. 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 409 (1792).
14. Certainly Congress could have utilized the power of the purse to require that re-
cipients of aid do more than is required by the Constitution. At least some officials argue
privately that since the wording in Title VI is broader than the 14th Amendment there
would be no statutory bar to imposing stiffer requirements. "Desegregation" is defined In
Title IV of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a), to exclude specifically "the transportation of
pupils . . . from one school to another or one school district to another in order to
achieve such racial balance .... " but this is not seen by many in HEW as controlling
on Title V1. Nevertheless, as a practical matter few in HEW feel it advisable at the mo-
ment to argue publicly that Title VI could be used as authority for imposing stiffer stan.
dards on the public than are required by the Constitution.
15. Civil rights leaders lobbied at the time against an exception for court ordera. N.Y.
Times, March 14, 1966, at 25, col. 1. Since then the NAACP and the United States Corn
mission on Civil Rights have attacked the practice of excepting court orders and have
called upon HEW to repeal the requirement. NAACP LEGAL DFrnNsE AND EDUCATION
FUND & AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITrEE, MEMO TO GARDNER: RP,,FORT ON me IMIPLE.
MENTATION OF TITLE VI OF 1964 IN REGARD TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 11 (1965); SOUTHERN
REGIONAL COUNCIL, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966: THE SLOW UNDOING 4 (1967). Judge
Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit stated from the bench during recent oral argument of a school
desegregation case that he could find no justification for the exception the government
made for a court order. Statement of Derrick Bell, Deputy Director, Office of Civil Rights,
HEW, August 10, 1966.
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district might have found itself forced to choose between losing federal
money or taking steps which could put it in contempt of court for
failure to observe a court order.
The ability of the Justice Department under Title IV or Title IX
to initiate or intervene in suits desegregating schools also creates fears
that the Justice Department might agree in such suits to a plan which
the Office of Education would then hold to be inadequate for purposes
of Title VI.16 The result might be unseemly public discord between
the policy at the Justice Department and at HEW to the embarrass-
ment of the whole executive branch.
The exception is also justified by a general feeling that as a mere
administrative agency HEW should not "get into the business of sec-
ond-guessing courts" by insisting on standards different from those
adopted by a court in a particular instance."7 Certainly implicit in this
statement is an awareness of the political consequences of attempting
to impose on a local school district requirements that go beyond those
on which the local courts have insisted. It also implies a judgment as
to the relative force a court order or an administrative requirement
has in the minds of a recalcitrant school district and suggests that HEW
was well aware of the danger to its prestige and credibility should it
publicly contradict a court, even though the court order on appeal
might be revised to eliminate the conflict in HEW's favor.
The wisdom of the exception, for whatever reason it was adopted,
continues to be debated within the Office of Education. One proposal
is to reinterpret "court order" to mean only those court orders in ac-
cordance with present judicial standards. Another more straightfor-
ward proposal is to amend the regulations. In 1966 when HEW had
under active consideration asking the President to sign the revised
guidelines eventually issued December 81, 1966,18 the possibility was
16. Section 407 of the Act provides that upon receipt of a complaint the Justice Depart-
ment shall institute suit if "the Attorney General believes the complaint is meritorious
and certifies that the signer or signers of such complaint are unable, in his judgment, to
initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings for relief and that the institution of
an action will materially further the orderly achievement of desegregation of public edu-
cation . ... 42 U.S.C. 2000c-6 (1964).
Section 902 provides: "Whenever an action has commenced in any court of the United
States seeking relief from the denial of equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution on account of race, color, religion, or national origin, the
Attorney General for or in the name of the United States may intervene in such action
upon timely application if the Attorney General certifies that the case is of general public
importance." 42 U.S.C. 2000h-2 (1964).
17. James M. Quigley, Assistant Secretary HEW, quoted in N.Y. Times. May 9, 1965.
at 40, col. 1. See also Sourram' EDUCATioN REPORT May-June, 1966, at 6.
18. The guidelines contain a statement of HEW's desegregation standards. Revised
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discussed of amending the regulations at the same time to eliminate
blanket acceptance of all court orders. However, when the idea of issu-
ing the guidelines as regulations was dropped for the present, the pro-
posal to amend section 80.4(C)(1) so as to eliminate acceptance of all
court orders was also abandoned at least temporarily. Official HEW
policy remains that the Office of Education will not directly pass on
the substantive quality of any court order.
HEW can examine the court order, however, and where appropriate
standards are found lacking it may ask the Justice Department to peti-
tion the court under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to revise
the court ordered plan. Furthermore, the Office of Education still re-
tains considerable power in administering and interpreting the regu-
lation. The government insists that even a school district subject to a
court order both assure HEW of its intent to comply with the order
and file on a regular basis reports describing the progress of desegre-
gation in the schools. 19 The Office of Education considers itself still
free to deny aid to a school district if it determines after a hearing that
the school district is not observing the court order, although this proce-
dure has been questioned by at least one court.20
HEW's policy towards court orders is complicated by the rather con-
fusing requirement that the order be a final one. The word can not
mean that the order be one "which ends the litigation and leaves noth-
Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Plans Under Title V1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. § 181 (1967). Though not actually issued as a regulation they are
treated as having the force of one. See p. 362 & note 95 infra. The guidelines were only
very slightly amended when reissued in December, 1966. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1967,
at 43, col. 1. The original 1965 guidelines may be found reprinted as an appendix
to Price v. Denison Independent School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010, 1015 (5th Cir.
1965).
19. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(c)(l); 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(b) (1967). HEW only began in the fall of 1067
to require reports on a regular basis from school districts subject to a court order. Tele-
phone interview with Edwin Yourman, Assistant General Counsel HEW for Education,
Sept. 14, 1967.
20. Statement of Harold Howe, U.S. Commissioner of Education, in Hearings Before
the Special Subcomm. on Civil Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 106-07, 109 (1966) [hereinafter cited as House Judiciary Hearings].
The District Court in Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 270 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Ala,
1967), rejected HEW's right to do so. At least in reference to the 99 A abama school dis.
tricts cited in Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967), the
court held that HEW could only bring a violation of the court order to the attention of
the court and could only cut off funds after the court had found the school district out of
compliance with the court order. The court reasons that to allow HEW to react to a viola-
tion of a court order before the court did would be an undue abdication of judicial authority
to enforce observance of its own orders. If the court does act at any timecan actually
holds the school district in compliance with its order, the government says it would then
defer to the judgment of the court regardless of any prior administrative action. State-
ment of David Seeley, former Director Equal Educational Opportunity Program (CEOP),
in House Judiciary Hearings 110.
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ing for the court to do but execute the judgment," nor can it refer to
the general rule that "a retained power of revision over an order ordi-
narily destroys its finality."2' 1 It is the rare desegregation order in which
the court does not retain jurisdiction, often for years, pending full im-
plementation of the decree. At any time the typical order may be re-
viewed and further relief granted. On the other hand, HEW obviously
does not mean to accept an order which is final simply in the sense that
it is appealable.
The requirement may in practice be intended only to reemphasize
that the order must be permanent and comprehensive; for the Office
of Education accepted a preliminary injunction "as a final court order"
when such preliminary injunction put into effect in two Alabama
school districts a comprehensive, though very weak plan of desegrega-
tion.2 In contrast the agency refused to adopt a decree which only re-
quired the admission of certain named individuals and an interim
order that provided for a complete desegregation plan but which was
made applicable only for the next term due to the court's wish to fur-
ther review the situation before issuing a permanent decree.2
The exception for court orders can produce curious results in cases
in which the courts simply incorporate as their court decrees the Office
of Education guidelines.2 Technically such orders may have to be
viewed as a court-ordered plan of desegregation with the result that
changes in Office of Education requirements would not be binding on
21. 6 J. MOORE, FED AL PAcrisE 54.12 [1] at 116 (2d ed. 1965); Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
22. United States v. Choctaw County Ed. of Educ., 259 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ala. 19G5);
Harris v. Crenshaw County Bd. of Educ., 259 F. Supp. 167 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
23. See Price v. Denison Independent Dist. Bd. of Educ., 848 F.2d 1010, 1015-16, (5th
Cir. 1965); Letter from David Seeley, former Director EEOP to attorney for Indlanola,
Mississippi, Municipal School District, Nov. 9, 1966.
HEW also interpreted the exception in its regulations for court orders as applying only
to those school districts which are formally named as defendants in the suit. In Lee v.
Macon County Ed. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 O.D. Ala. 1967), the Macon County School
Board, the Governor, and state educational officials were the defendants. The other Indi-
vidual school districts, though listed in the court's order, were not actually party to the
suit. Accordingly, HEV sought to withhold funds from Lanett City, one of the school
districts subject to the court order, because it viewed as unsatisfactory the plan submitted
pursuant to the court order. The court in response joined several HEW officials to the
suit as defendants and forbade them to terminate federal aid to the school district. Lee
v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 270 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Ala. 1967). HEW officials emphasize
that the incident does not represent a change in HEVs policy of accepting all final court
orders. Interview with Edwin Yourman, Assistant General Counsel of HEW for Education,
July 31, 1967.
24. In Zinnerman v. Board of Pub. Instruction, Civil No. 64-264 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 24,
1966), 11 RAcE Pia- L. REP. 155 (1966), the court decree merely ordered observance of the
guidelines. It followed stipulation by the parties that a freedom of choice plan approved
by the government would be followed and such would be sufficient to meet plaintiff's
objection.
927
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the school district unless and until the court revises its order to reflect
the changes made by the government. In such cases the exception for
court orders results in added procedural formalities unjustified by any
of the reasons which motivated HEW to make the exception for court
orders in the first place.
Some courts have sought to avoid this by framing an order simply
directing the school officials to comply with all present or future Office
of Education requirements. 25 The practical effect of the order is to
make the school district submit to Office of Education requirements
rather than those set by the court.2
B. Other Areas of Administrative Reliance on the Courts
While Title VI perhaps did not require the government to accept
court orders in lieu of an Office of Education desegregation plan, there
are other instances in which the statute left HEW considerably less
freedom in deciding whether deference to and reliance on the courts
was appropriate.
One such instance appears on the face of the statute. Section 603 in
effect provides for appeal of final orders terminating funds under Sec-
tion 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.2 7 The right of appeal,
however, has apparently never been used by a school district which has
lost federal aid. The cost of litigation and the probable weakness of
25. Macklin v. County Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 4392 (M.D. Tenn. April 16, 1966), 11
RAcE REL. L. REP. 805.
26. In other cases the problem may be compounded by an ambiguous decree which
does not make clear whether the court order requires observance only of the guidelines as
they read at the time the decree comes down or whether the school district must observe
any future changes as well. In Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd,, Civil No. 15978
(E.D. La. Oct. 13, 1965), 11 RAcE R.L. L. REP. 171, 173 (1966), the court ordered the school
district to meet all requirements of the General Statement of Policies under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At least one court has faced the problem squarely in an
effort to avoid either ambiguity or circularity. Asked to enjoin the construction of new
schools by a school district operating under a freedom of choice plan approved by the
Office of Education, the court specifically states that its refusal to enjoin the construction
and its approval of the plan adopted by the board should not be construed as placing the
district in the status of those meeting their desegregation obligations under a desegrega-
tion order of a federal court, within the meaning of the guidelines, 45 C.F.R. § 181.2
(1967). Kelley v. Altheimer Pub. School Dist. No. 22, Civil No. PB-66-C-10 (E.D. Ark,
June 3, 1966), 11 RACE REL. L. Ra,. 1187, 1194, rev'd 378 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1967).
27. Section 603 provides:
In the case of action, not otherwise subject to judicial review, terminating or refl titng
to grant or to continue financial assistance upon a finding of failure to comply with
any requirement imposed pursuant to section 602, any person aggrieved (including
any state or political subdivision thereof and any agency oF either) may obtain judicial
review of such action in accordance with section 1009 of Title 5 [Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act) and such action shall not be deemed committed to un-
reviewable agency discretion within the meaning of that section. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2
(1964).
The regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 80.11 (1967) recognize the right to such review.
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the school district's desegregation record have curtailed such efforts,
especially since an appeal might only hasten a court-ordered desegre-
gation plan.
Of greater practical significance is HEW's dependence on the courts
to chart the outer limits of Tide VI and to enforce non-discrimination
in those areas Tite VI is not broad enough to cover. At least under
present HEW policy, the Office of Education's ability to attack dis-
crimination will only grow and evolve as the constitutional require-
ments themselves do, for the government is only attempting to impose
the same conditions required by the 14th Amendment.2 The result of
course is that future changes in HEW standards to permit attacks on
the worst examples of racial imbalance or the elimination of freedom
of choice as a legitimate desegregation plan will only occur if courts
hold such phenomena and practices unconstitutional. Until the courts
strike down the free choice plan, the Office of Education will not move,
and once the courts so hold, the Office of Education has no cloice but
to act accordingly.2
Aside from the reliance by the Office of Education on courts to enun-
ciate substantive standards, difficulties implicit in the nature of sanc-
tions provided by Title VI make further recourse to the courts impera-
tive. Because Title VI gives the Office of Education directly only the
power to terminate federal aid, the government must rely on the courts
to actually achieve desegregation in those school districts where federal
money is refused. Originally HEW officials hoped that the Justice De-
partment could bring suits quickly enough against holdouts to prevent
any school district from actually losing funds.30
In June 1965 the Justice Department announced its readiness to help
by launching a massive attack on all who refused federal aid rather than
comply with Office of Education requirements.31 By August 15, 1967,
only tventy-five school districts originally subject to final termination
proceedings had come back into compliance as a result of court orders
28. The Justice Department, for instance, in the brief submitted for plaintiff and as
amicus curiae in Alabama, NAACP State Conference of Branches v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp.
346 (M.D. Ala. 1957), argues on page 20 of the unprinted draft that "none of the standards
of the revised statement of policy require school boards to take action not positively
required by the 14th Amendment and therefore by 601" (emphasis added).
29. Interview with Edwin Yourman, Assistant General Counsel of HEW for Education,
Nov. 26, 1966. See also Washington Post, Aug. 8, 1957, at 5, col. 1.
30. James M. Quigley, Assistant Secretary of HEW, was quoted as saying "A Board
might decide not to apply for federal aid on Monday night, then on Tuesday the) have
a law suit and on Friday get an order to desegregate." N.Y. Times, May 9, 1965, at 40,
col. 1.
31. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1965, at 1, col 1.
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obtained subsequent to HEW's action. Fifty-five school districts remain
ineligible for federal aid.32 Obviously, then, the Justice Department
has not been able to date to avoid completely the necessity to deny
school districts federal aid. Even when a court order is secured there
is inevitably a time lag during which the school district is without
federal aid.
In addition to allowing the administering agency to achieve compli-
ance by terminating or refusing aid to recipients who refuse to conply
with desegregation requirements, Title VI also empowers the agency
to proceed "by any other means authorized by law."83 This represents
an effort to provide an alternative to the severe step of denying all fed-
eral aid. One such alternative, which would entail reliance on the
courts, is suggested by the standard paragraph in the form all recipients
must sign which states that the appropriate assurance of compliance
is given in consideration of and for the purpose of obtaining any
and all Federal grants, loans, contract, property, discounts or other
Federal financial assistance. . . . The applicant recognizes and
agrees that such Federal financial assistance will be extended in
reliance on the representations and agreements made in the assur-
ance and that the United States or the State agency.., jointly or
severally shall have the right to seek enforcement of this assur-
ance.84
HEW included this wording with the specific intent of making as-
surances enforceable in a court action asking for specific performance.
The agency has not extensively explored the possibility of sUch an
alternative yet, however. High HEW officials have only expressed an
intent to use such legal alternatives in the future "as the program pro-
ceeds."35 The one actual effort to date to use the provision ended in-
conclusively. 6
32. Seven other school districts voluntarily submitted satisfactory desegregation plans
after becoming subject to a final termination order. In all 329 school districts have met
their requirements under Title VI by submitting satisfactory court orders. Of these 529
court orders, 137 were secured before the passage of Title VI. Another 99 represent Ala.
bama school districts subject to the statewide injunction issued in Lee v. Macon County
Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967). This leaves 93 school districts subject to
court orders individually obtained since 1965. Telephone interview with Joshua Zatman,
Acting Chief of the Information Branch of the Office for Civil Rights, IEW, Aug. 17,
1967.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964).
34. HEW Form 441-B, 45 C.F.R. § 181, Attachment 1 (1967).
35. Statement of F. Peter Libassi, Director, Office of Civil Rights, HEW, in House
Judiciary Hearings 131. In many cases specific performance would not be feasible since
most of the money would have been spent and the ability to impose specific perfortnance
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Courts must also be depended on to reach practices which do not
relate directly to the pupil and which therefore are not subject to any
requirements the Office of Education can impose under Title VI. For
instance, a school board may violate the 14th Amendment by paying
Negro teachers less than white teachers of comparable qualifications or
by firing a teacher because he is Negro. The guidelines require each
school district to pledge not to fire, demote, or fail to promote teachers
because they are Negroes.37 Section 604 of the Act prohibits, however,
the executive branch from applying Title VI to employment practices.
Therefore, the Office of Education claims only the right to regulate
faculty hiring practices as a necessary means of achieving a desegregated
student body. Before action can be taken under Title VI the students
must be shown to be affected by the discriminatory treatment of faculty
members. It is necessary to show a nexus between such acts and a con-
tinuation by the community of thinking in terms of "white schools"
and "Negro schools" or to prove that in some other way the Negroes'
right to equal educational opportunities is threatened. To date HEW
has conceded such a showing is too difficult in most circumstances.3s
Officials are now considering whether it might be possible to prove that
thereby lost before a court order could be secured. However, if under the regulations a
school district, upon agreeing to comply with Title VI, receives aid to build a school or
othenise create a real property interest and then continues to discriminate against Ne-
groes in the use of such property, the denial of future funds would not cure tie continued
non-compliance with respect to the prior funds. 45 C.F.R. § 80.5(e) (1967). Compliance
could, however, be secured through a court order securing specific performance of the
prior assurance submitted to the Office of Education. It may be that it is in this context
that HEW will most commonly ask the courts to issue specific performance orders en-
forcing its agreement with school districts.
36. The Department of Justice on March 21, 1967, filed suit in which for the first time
it asked for an order enforcing the compliance assurance given by the Dale County, Ala-
bama, School District. N.Y. Times, far. 22, 1967, at 26, col. 1. Presumably the complaint
charged breach of contract and asked for specific performance. This particular case how-
ever may well have become moot as a result of Lee v. Macon County lEd. of Educ., 267
F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967). Dale County was one of the school districts named in the
order. Officials at the Justice Department do not expect that much more will be done in
the immediate future to develop this approach.
37. 45 C.F.R. § 181.13(c) (1967).
38. When the Arkansas Teachers Association complained to the Office of Education
that disparity of salaries based on race was a widespread practice in that state, the govern-
ment did not invoke Title VI. As late as December, 1966, officials conceded that there had
not yet been an instance where it was possible to make the necessary causal connection.
Statement of David Seeley, former Director of EEOP, in House Judiciary Hearings 146-47.
When Jack Greenberg of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund demanded that the government
take action to prevent the firing of 500 Negro teachers in North Carolina during the
1965-66 school year due to the closing of Negro schools, the Office of Education stated
publicly that Title VI did not give it any authority to move against such practices. N.Y.
Times, May 25, 1965, at 1, col. 4. See also Wall v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d
275 (4th Cir. 1967).
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the Negro's ability to learn is hindered by a sense of inferiority created
by knowledge of a discriminatory act against any Negro teacher in the
school.8 9 At the moment, however, the usefulness of Title VI to pre-
vent such practices remains problematical.
II. The Courts' Authority to Act Subsequent to the
Office of Education
Like HEW, the courts with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
had to decide how best to coordinate their own efforts with those of
other federal instrumentalities. The narrowest question that confronts
the courts concerns their right to decide a school desegregation case on
its merits where the school district is already subject to a plan specifi-
cally approved by HEW.
The courts generally agree that prior administrative action does not
deny them the right to exercise their own independent judgment.
Marks v. Edenburg School District40 is typical of the position the great
majority of the courts have taken. While the defendant did not argue
that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, it did cite the ap-
proval by the government of its plan and suggested that was all it need
show. The court had little trouble in holding that prior administrative
action was not "conclusive" on the court. It merely noted that consti-
tutional rights are for the courts to determine and are separate from
any finding the executive may make in connection with the granting
of federal aid.
A conflict between guideline standards and court standards was not
really an issue in the case for the school board's progress was clearly
39. Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 200 (1965), and United States v. Jefferson County Bd.
of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3138 (Oct. 9, 1967) hold
that a nexus exists between a general failure to provide desegregated faculties and the
student's opportunity to receive an equal education. Officials hope to extend such rulings
to individual cases of faculty discrimination. Jefferson, however, concedes that "Congress
did not, of course, intend to provide a forum for the relief of individual teachers who
might be discriminatorily discharged; Congress was interested in a general requirement
essential to success of the program as a whole." 372 F.2d at 883.
As the discriminatory practices become even further removed from the students for
whom the federal grant is made, the ability of the Office of Education to prevent con.
tinued discriminatory practices becomes even more remote and the need of court action
even more obvious. For instance the National Defense Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 401-592
(1958), authorizes forgiveness by the government of part of the money owed It by former
students who have availed themselves of government loans under the program to finance
their own education. The statute authorizes forgiveness of part of the loan for every year
the former student teaches after completing his education. HEW is unsure at present
whether such provisions apply even if the former student is teaching on a segregated fac.
ulty or to a segregated student body.
40. 259 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ark. 1966).
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below that required by the government. Had the courts mistakenly
adopted some policy of judicial restraint in the case of school districts
desegregating under administrative orders, the practical effect would
have simply been continued segregation until the Office of Education
found the time to pursue the school district and obtain enforcement or
a termination of funds.41
Not all cases have gone this way. Turner v. Goolsby-' ordered the
admission of named individuals to schools in Taliaferro County, Geor-
gia, but refused to consider a motion for a comprehensive desegregation
order.
Desegregation of the public school system other than in the de-
gree hereinafter discussed is a matter over which the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare of the Executive Department of
the federal government has already assumed jurisdiction. It ap-
pears without dispute that the school board of Taliaferro County
has submitted a plan of action to that department.43
The rationale of the decision reflects an extraordinary conception of
the relationship between the courts and the Office of Education. There
is no evidence that the plan was acceptable to the Office of Education,
and indeed it could not have been since subsequently the school board
sought unsuccessfully to meet the requirements of Title VI by submit-
ting the opinion itself ordering the admission of 87 Negroes to white
schools.
More importantly, since the Office of Education necessarily concerns
itself with every school district in the country, to hold that HEW has
preempted jurisdiction would relegate the courts to the purely appel-
late role of reviewing the particular treatment afforded a school district
by the government. It would be a strange result indeed if plaintiffs were
so barred from suing directly in federal court to secure constitutional
rights. Nor does case law demand such a result.
Such school desegregation cases as Carson v. Warlicl1"4 and Holt v.
Raleigh City Board of Education45 deferred federal court action until
action before state administrative agencies had been completed. These
41. For a discussion of the same problem as applied to hospitals recci-ing federal aid,
see Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Assn, 375 F.2d 6t18 (4th Cir.
1967).
42. 255 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1965).
43. Id. at 726. Worthy of consideration is the court's solution of the teacher desegre-
gation problem in Price v. Denison Independent Dist. School Bd., 348 F.2d 1010 (5ti Cir.
1965).
44. 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956).
45. 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1959).
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cases involved, however, the failure of individual plaintiffs to exhaust
first state administrative remedies which were constitutional on their
face and which were designed both to fulfill investigatory functions and
to grant immediate relief. In cases involving Title VI the conflict is sim-
ply with another federal agency which may not be able to afford plaintiffs
adequate relief. Unlike the parties to the above school desegregation
cases, plaintiffs here do not have access to any administrative process in
which they can play a direct role. Though they can lodge a complaint
with the Office of Education they have no way of forcing action on their
complaint. Even if the Office of Education acted, the government could
in the end only withhold aid. The plaintiffs' right to attend a desegre-
gated school would not be assured. Commenting on the availability of
similar administrative relief by a state agency in McNeese v. Board of
Education, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote that "when federal rights are
subject to such tenuous protection, prior resort to a state proceeding
is not necessary.1
46
III. The Problem of Disparities Between Court Orders
and Office of Education Requirements
The Office of Education's exception for court orders has provided a
loophole in some cases for recalcitrant school districts, enabling them
to preserve their right to federal funds while pursuing desegregation
plans far less stringent or effective than those they would have been
subject to had they voluntarily adopted one of the desegregation plans
contained in the guidelines.
In 1965, the first year, only 137 school districts filed court orders with
the Office of Education that entitled them to continued federal aid.47
There are some 5,146 school districts in the 17 Southern and Border
States.48 These court orders, however, affected a school populatioit in
the South out of all proportion to their numbers, for in large part they
represented the work of the NAACP and other activists in the late '50's
and early '60's who chose because of limited resources to concentrate on
the larger urban school districts in the South.49
46. 979 U.S. 668, 676 (1962).
47. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1965, at 50, col. 3.
48. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1965, at 47, col. 1.
49. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1966, at 25, col. 1 A Partial list of Southern cities operating
undei court orders includes Atlanta, New Orleans, Miami, Jackson, Montgomery, Ir-
mingham, Nashville, Charleston, Little Rock, and Richmond. SOUTHERN REGIONAL COtN-
CIL, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1966: THE SLow UNDOING 30 (1967). Lotlslada illustrates most
dramatically what can happen. As of summer, 1965, 18 parishes In Louisiana were subject
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Many of the court orders obtained, especially the early ones, imposed
less stringent requirements than those established by the Office of Edu-
cation.50 Louisiana's response to Title VI suggests how, as a conse-
quence, some school districts turned to the courts in the hope of evad-
ing the guidelines. In 1965 the Office of Education succeeded in per-
suading only three of the 67 parishes in the state to adopt the voluntary
plans suggested by the guidelines. Except for those that qualified for
federal aid through court orders, all the remaining parishes refused to
file anything with the Office of Education, preferring instead to avait
suit and risk termination of federal funds.r'
The problem of the proper relationship between courts and the Of-
fice of Education was thus posed in an obvious and immediate form.
Judge Wisdom in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal School District,52 an
opinion handed down within two months of the first appearance of the
guidelines, was one of the first to see the difficulty that would result
should the Office of Education's standards differ from those adopted by
the courts. Consequently, Wisdom altered the deadline for extending
the free choice plain to all grades so as to conform with the standards
established in the guidelines. As to the details of the plan, the opinion
referred the parties and the district court to the guidelines.
The Fifth Circuit returned to the problem in United States v. Jeffer-
son County School Board of Education.5 Judge Wisdom once again
refers to the problem of disparity of standards between courts and the
Office of Education as only encouraging evasion of the law, cites long
passages from Singleton, and concludes, "[w]e shall not permit the courts
to be used to destroy or dilute the effectiveness of the congressional pol-
to court orders. This represented less than one-fourth of the total number of parishes in
the state. However these 18 parishes accounted for more than three-quarters of the total
federal aid for education to which Louisiana would have been entitled for 1964-65 if all
parishes in the state had been in compliance. N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1965, at 19, ol. I.
50. Judge Wisdom accepted figures submitted by Justice Department lawvyers as an
accurate description of some 99 court-approved freedom of choice plans approved by
courts in the 5th Circuit before April, 1966. They show that "44 do not de!c7qate all
grades by 1967; 78 fail to provide specific, non-radal criteria for denying doices; 79 fail
to provide any start toward faculty desegregation; only 22 provide for transfers to take
courses not otherwise available; only 4 include the Singleton transfer rule." United States
v. Jefferson County Ed. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 860 n.52 (5th Cir. 1966). In all these re-
spects they thus fall short of what the Office of Education now requires in its guidelines.
51. Telephone interview with Mrs. Catherine Welsh, Public Information Branch of
the Office for Civil Rights, HEW, Nov. 14, 1967. As of October, 1967, the number of
school districts subject to court orders had risen to 50. Since 1965 no school district in
addition to the original three has submitted voluntary plans.
52. 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965); see Price v. Denison Independent School Dist. Ind. of
Educ., 348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965).
53. 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3138 (Oct. 9, 1967).
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icy expressed in Title VI.154 In order to prevent such evasion of Title
VI, Jefferson promulgates a model court decree, binding on all district
courts in the Fifth Circuit, that closely resembles the guidelines.
Judge Wisdom admits in Jefferson that the recalcitrance of the dis-
trict court judges in his circuit is at least partly responsible for the
problem:
In certain cases-cases we consider unnecessary to cite-there has
even been a manifest variance between this Court's decision and a
later district court decision. A number of district courts still mis-
takenly assume that transfers under Pupil Placement Laws-super-
imposed on unconstitutional individual assignment-satisfy the
requirements of a desegregation plan. 5
Viewed in this light the problem caused by the disparity between
Office of Education standards and court orders is largely an adminis.
trative one of finding a device to insure implementation by district
courts of appellate courts' standards. Jefferson does not simply estab-
lish as law requirements that approximate the guidelines. It also rep-
resents a novel effort to find a new way that will insure that district
court judges actually implement the law. Adoption by the Court of
Appeals without the benefit of a prior evidentiary hearing of a model
decree which all district courts must follow in desegregating schools
represents a sharp departure from the former ad hoc approach of courts
in school desegregation cases. Previously court decrees were individ-
ually tailored by district courts to fit the particular circumstances of
a given school district. Brown II specifically indicated that blanket
approaches by appellate courts to desegregation problems were to be
avoided. In an effort, however, to insure application of sufficiently
vigorous standards Jefferson denies the district court judges some of
the discretion Brown 11 specifically granted them and moves toward
the same kind of centralized administration of desegregation through
uniform decrees that the Office of Education itself uses.
Adoption of the model court decree still need not insure an end to
54. Id. at 859-60.
55. Id. at 860-61. Not all federal district judges in the South are so uncooperative, ]n
fact, former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach estimated in 1965 that approximately
70% of the district judges in the South are reliably committed to the goal of achieving
desegregation as expeditiously as possible. N. Y. Times, June 20, 1965, at 1, col. 2. It
would hardly be surprising if the Fifth Circuit was found to contain more of the remain-
ing 30% of district court judges than any other circuit. Some of the reasons for the
failure of a few Southern district court judges to apply the desegregation laws fully are
mentioned by Judge Wisdom in Political Role of Federal Courts, 21 Sw. L.J. 411, 420
(1967).
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the problem. While the court decree and the guidelines are very simi-
lar in most respects, there are slight variations.O On their face none
of the changes the court makes would appear to give district courts the
right to avoid the main thrust of the guideline requirements, but the
fact that elsewhere the court decree so closely follows the guidelines
may enable school boards to convince a few district court judges that
every omission or the slightest change in wording by the Court of
Appeals represents an implied rejection of the guideline requirements,
and that such rejection encourages or at least allows the district court
to condone further evasion of the duty of the school board to desegre-
gate completely and immediately.
Judge Wisdom might have avoided some of these possible problems
by simply declaring instead that henceforth all district courts should
adopt in their court decrees the Office of Education guidelines and that
whenever the Office of Education changes its guidelines the courts
should do likewise. As we have seen, district courts in the past have
delivered analogous decrees specifying that the court ordered plan
shall be any plan promulgated by the Office of Education. Judge Wis-
dom chose not to do so, though the en banc opinion affirming Jefferson
moves toward such a solution by declaring: "courts in this circuit
should give great weight to future HEW guidelines, when such guide-
lines are applicable to this circuit and are within lawful limits." OT
Judge Wisdom undoubtedly declined simply to incorporate all present
and future guidelines because he wished to preserve the independence of
the courts and to avoid giving even the appearance of blind adherence
56. The guidelines list specific examples of faculty desegregation plans that may be
adopted: "some desegregation" in each school or the assignment of a "significant portion"
of the white or Negro staff to schools where they are a minority or to schools where the
students themselves are desegregated, 45 C.F.R. § 181.13 (1967). The Fifth Circuit decree
simply cautions that "wherever possible, teachers shall be assigned so that more than one
teacher of the minority race (white or Negro) shall be on a desegregated faculty" and
then orders defendants to "take positive and affirmative steps to accomplish the desegre-
gation of their school faculties and to achieve substantial desegregation of faculties in as
many schools as possible for the 1967-68 school year" 372 F.2d at 900. While perhaps the
result called for in 1967-68 is similar to what the guidelines call for, the standards are les
definite. The court decree in requiring desegregation of all special education programs such
as adult education does not bar use of free choice to desegregate such programs. Id. at 899.
The guidelines do. 45 C.F.R. § 181.14(b)(4) (1967). The court decree adds an exception to
the wording in the guidelines prohibiting the discriminatory denial to any students of full
access to services, facilities, activities and programs. 45 C.F.tL § 181.14(a) (1967). Jefferson
allows the continued application of "long standing non-racially based rules" relating to
eligibility of transfer students to compete in athletic events. 372 F.2d at 899. The guide-
lines provide that prospective students new to the system be given a choice period of at
least one week. 45 C.F.R. § 181.47 (1967). The court sets no minimum length of time for
such choice to be exercised. 372 F.2d at 899.
57. Printed court copy of en banc opinion affirming United States v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), March 29, 1967, at 7.
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to the guidelines. The approach adopted was an answer to the conten-
tion made by the school districts during oral argument that court
adoption of the guidelines would amount to abdication of its judicial
responsibility.5 Refusal simply to incorporate Office of Education stan-
dards also left the court more room to evolve later stricter constitu-
tional requirements and to interpret the requirements announced in
Jefferspn differently than does the Office of Education.
The decree is not self-executing on school districts not parties to the
§uit. District courts superyising the 100-odd school desegregation plans
in the Fifth Circuit that predate Jefferson must be petitioned to revise
their court orders to conform with the new appellate standards. As a
result of the opinion the Justice Department and the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund have announced plans to reopen desegre-
gation cases both in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere in the South.60
The time lag will be considerable, though. Furthermore, immediate
observance of Jefferson by district court judges in the Fifth Circuit is
not assured. Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board0 argues that district
court judges need not necessarily apply Jefferson exactly to other school
districts, for to do so would render Jefferson an advisory opinion in
which the Court of Appeals improperly sought to tell the district court
judges in advance of a hearing what to do. The court implies a dis-
tinction between constitutional standards and the model decree, holds
itself bound only to follow the former, and refuses to amend the court
order to conform in all respects to the Jefferson model decree. The
opinion ignores much in Jefferson and rests on the mistaken notion
that a free choice plan that fails to produce any desegregation can still
be adequate."
58. N. Y. Times, May 25, 1966, at 24, col. 4. The court had asked counsel for briefs
on 2 specific questions: a) "to what extent consistent with judicial prerogatives and obli.
gations, statutory and constitutional, is it permissible and desirable for a federal court(trial or appellate) to give weight to or to rely on Health, Education, and Welfare guide-
lines and policies in cases before the court; b) If permissible and desirable, what practical
means and methods do you suggest that federal courts (trial and appellate) should follow
in making Health, Education, and Welfare guidelines and policies judicially effective."
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 848 n.13 (5th Cir. 1960).
59. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1967, at 14, col. 3; N.Y. Times, April 6, 1967, at 27, col. 1.
60. 268 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. La. 1967).
61. The court finds that the Negroes had had a genuine opportunity to transfer
schools and that their failure to do so did not invalidate the plan. The present segre-
gation is described as de facto and the school district held free of any duty to alirmatively
secure desegregation. Judge West thereby continues to argue an issue presumably settled
by the holding in Jefferson that in formerly segregated systems school districts must act
affirmatively to secure desegregation. The judge's reluctance to accept Jeflerson is demon.
strated again in Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 269 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. La.
1967). This case was one of seven heard together with Jefferson before the Court of Ap.
peals en bane. Judge West therefore had no choice but to apply the model decree.
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Finally, the Jefferson opinion represents only an effort of one circuit
to close the loophole created by HEW's exception for court orders.
The Fourth and Sixth circuits have not yet specifically ruled on the
advisability of an approach similar to the Jefferson opinion.0 2 The
Eighth Circuit in Clark v. Board of EducationG3 has specifically refused
to adopt the Jefferson holding; Judge Gibson in effect concludes that the
district courts can be relied on to thwart any such attempts by tie
states.
IV. Judicial Assessment of Relative Institutional Competence
Both in the substantive standards adopted and the method of admin-
istration employed the Jefferson opinion represents the tendency of at
least one circuit to look more and more toward Washington in dis-
charging its duty to assure plaintiffs their constitutional right to a
desegregated education. The opinion indicates that this deference by
the courts arises from more than a mere wish to see that court orders
do not become a route in a few cases for evasion of Title VI. Judge
Wisdom also argues in terms of an assessment of the supposed relative
institutional competence of the two institutions. The failure of liti-
gation in other circuits to follow a similar pattern suggests other courts
see the comparison differently-perhaps, as will be explored later, for
reasons more practical than conceptual.
A. Expertise: The Question of Substantive Standards
In cases requiring a court order directing the desegregation of a
school system the judge has the option either to rely on the Office of
Education or to tailor his own special plan for the districts. If his plan
However he added a strongly worded opinion attaking Jefferson and argued that de
facto segregation in the South was still constitutional and the Court of Appeals wrong.
62. The silence of the Fourth Circuit is significant. For instance, in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mechlenburg Bd. of Educ., 569 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1966), the court passed on the reasonable-
ness of the geographic zoning and the permissibility of allowing any student so assigned
on the basis of geographic zoning to transfer to any other school. The court without
hesitation held the lines adequately drawn and the transfer plan fair despite the fact that
the revised guidelines issued after the district court opinion bar such transfer plans. 45
C.F.R. § 181.33 (1967). Itnotes that in most cases any reasonable alternative would not
have produced any greater integration. There is no talk of the guidelines, no discussion
of whether to rely on the expertise of the Office of Education. At the least, it would ap-
pear unlikely that the Fourth Circuit will soon endorse the approach of the Fifth Circuit.
In the Sixth Circuit, Monroe v. City Bd. of Commrs, 880 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1957) has
rejected Jefferson to the extent that that case orders Southern school districts to achieve
greater racial balance than is required in Northern schools. Nothing is said of the admin-
istrative approach adopted in Jefferson or Jefferson's attitude toward the Office of Educa-
tion and Title VI.
63. 374 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1967).
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is sufficiently demanding this latter approach need not be inconsistent
with efforts to prevent use of the courts as a way to avoid Title VI
requirements.
Deference to HEW standards is found in all circuits but most com-
monly it occurs in the Fifth. Numerous cases, even before Jefferson,
adopted the HEW plans without explanation.64 Reliance on the HEW
guidelines in such cases might result in simply an order for the parties
to adopt any plan approved by the Office of Education under present,
or in a few cases, future standards. 5
Technically such reliance in this last instance on the guidelines makes
the school district subject to Office of Education requirements in a
way Title VI never contemplated. Under such a solution the school
district must follow government requirements whether it chooses to
receive federal aid or not and whether the court has reviewed them
or not. This therefore gives to the Office of Education powers beyond
those found in the Civil Rights Act. Such court orders, in effect dele-
gating power to the Office of Education to write and rewrite the court
decree, are certainly examples of unusually complete judicial deference
to an administrative agency. It is qualified only by the district court
judge's power to decide at any moment to modify his decree so as not
to require conformity with present or future guidelines. One dissent-
ing judge has seen in such practices problems of constitutional dimen-
sion.6 Since HEW professes to base its guidelines only on constitu.
tional requirements as evolved by the courts, there is also a danger
64. The court simply writes a detailed decree closely patterned after portions of the
guidelines, although no specific reference is made to the Office of Education anywhere
in the opinion. Where variations occur they are likely to be in respect to faculty desegre-
gation. See, e.g., Carr v. Montgomery County 3Bd. of Educ., 253 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Ala.
1966); Harris v. Bullock County Bd. of Educ., 253 F. Supp. 276 (M.D. Ala. 1966). Due to
Jefferson this approach will, of course, now be the exclusive one in the Fifth Circuit.
65. Zinnerman v. Board of Pub. Instruction, Civil No. 64-264 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 24,
1966), 11 RAcE RLz.. L. REP. 155; Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., Civil No. 15973
(E.D. La. Oct. 13, 1965), 11 RAGE REL. L. REP. 171 (1966) (school board subject to most
HEW requirements after year transitional period); Everett v. Lone Oak Independent
School Dist., Civil No. CA3-1477 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 1966), 11 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1261
(additional wording on faculty desegregation adopted but otherwise parties referred to
guidelines); Bryant v. Carteret County Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 648 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 19,
1965), 11 RAcE REL. L. REP. 740 (1966); Macklin v. County Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 4392
(I.D. Tenn. April 11, 1966), 11 RAcE RE.. L. REP. 805.
66. Judge Bell's dissenting opinion to the en banc decision affirming United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), extrapolates the decree into
one that does in fact give carte blanche powers to HEW. He then argues that such sur-
render of judicial powers to the executive erodes the doctrine of separation of powers
and concludes that this fact makes it a sad day for the district courts and for the entire
judiciary.
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of complete stasis in the system should all courts decide to rely on
HEW guidelines.
One justification for such practices, found in Jefferson and a few
circuit court cases, is based on a belief in the greater expertise of the
Office of Education.6 7 In the Jefferson opinion Wisdom refers to "ex-
perts in education and school administration,"08 mentions "their day-
to-day experience with thousands of school systems,"0 notes that "it is
evident to anyone that the guidelines were carefully formulated by
educational authorities,"70 and contrasts such qualifications with judi-
cial ignorance. "[M'ost judges," he asserts, "do not have sufficient com-
petence-they are not educators or school administrators--to know the
right questions, much less the right answers." 7'
None of the Fifth Circuit cases addresses itself to the threshold prob-
lem of distinguishing administrative questions from those the court
should still use its own judgment in deciding. Certainly "administra-
tive" could not refer solely to the ministerial problems associated with
implementing a given plan in a given school district. Wisdom must
mean by "administrative" far broader questions of substance relating
to the speed and manner at which a school district should move toward
full desegregation. On the other hand, Wisdom makes clear in an earlier
opinion, Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District,72 that
not all questions concerning the rate at which a school district should
desegregate are mere "administrative" problems. In reviewing the
school plan formulated by the district court and the Jackson School
Board as a result of the earlier holding on the case, Wisdom concedes
that the guidelines establish only minimum standards and that in cer-
tain circumstances a court would be compelled in meeting its consti-
tutional duties to issue an order different from the Office of Education
directed plans. Though in this decision he proceeds to deny the gov-
ernment's argument that all twelve grades be desegregated immediately,
67. See Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 731 (5th
Cir. 1965), where Wisdom writes that great deference should be paid to the guidelines
because "[albsent legal questions, the U.S.O. of E. is better qualified than the courts and
is the more appropriate federal body to weigh administrative difficulties inherent in
school desegregation plans." Price v. Denison Independent School Dist. 3d. of Educ.,
348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965). The latter argues that judges are not equipped to do the
job as well as HEW, while distinguishing between justiciable and operational questions.
68. United States v. Jefferson County 11d. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cu. 1966).
69. Id. at 896.
70. Id. at 858.
71. Id. at 855.
72. 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1966).
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and instead reaffirms the same time schedule as the guidelines employ,
he does so only after reviewing the question on its merits, thereby
suggesting in light of his previous concession that the motion raises
legal rather than administrative issues and thus should be decided by
the courts acting independently. In short, the Office of Education per-
haps should decide the narrow question of whether a school must
desegregate three or four grades in the first year; the courts will decide
the broad question of whether all 12 grades must be desegregated the
first year or not.
Not all courts have enthusiastically argued for deference to the Office
of Education because of its greater expertise. The Eighth Circuit first
addressed itself to the problem in Kemp v. Beasley."3 Judge Gibson
agrees that the guidelines must be "heavily relied upon." However,
he adds that "we are not in complete agreement with the conclusion
of the Fifth Circuit."74 He gives two reasons. The first is based on the
role of the court as traditional guardian of constitutional rights and on
the court's responsibility whenever faced with the question to give full
relief, which "is not dependent upon federally financed programs, but
is an inherent right that is completely separate and apart from the
executive function of regulating and financing schools."75
The argument that a deliberate discrepancy could develop between
constitutional and Office of Education standards proves little. While
legislation requiring such different standards is theoretically possible
the argument is simply not relevant to Title VI, for as noted above
the policy of the government is to require under Title VI only what
the Constitution requires.
Furthermore, none dispute that the courts must still decide "legal"
in contrast to "administrative" problems. The objection that because
the guidelines may be something more or less than codification of con-
stitutional requirements, they cannot be relied on by courts charged
with setting constitutional standards ignores the distinction drawn by
Judge Wisdom and his intent to rely on the Office of Education only
for guidance in administrative questions. Apparently for these other
judges concerned with a possible disparity, all questions are legal ones,
and thus constitutional ones, and the distinction the Fifth Circuit
makes is to them an unreal one.
73. 352 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1965).
74. Id. at 19.
75. Id.
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Judge Gibson also argues in Kemp that "by allowing acceptance of
a court-approved plan in lieu of one approved by the Department of
Education, the regulations recognize the need for day-by-day and case-
by-case flexibility that can be supplied by the federal courts sitting in
the various districts."76 It may be doubted seriously whether the regu-
latory exception was inspired by the reasoning Gibson ascribes to
HEW.77 Apart, however, from whether the court correctly characterizes
the government's motive, the opinion's assumption that courts can do a
better job is an important dictum. In Clark v. Board of Education Judge
Gibson reiterates his view that district courts should be allowed flexi-
bility in adapting desegregation plans to particular circumstances. 78
In denying a petition for a rehearing of the case Gibson specifically
refuses to follow the approach adopted in Jefferson and to accept the
guidelines "as our absolute star for determining constitutional rights
and duties .. -. " He relies partly on the belief first voiced in Kemp
that such would violate the doctrine of separation of powers; but he
then goes on to distinguish Jefferson as involving different factual cir-
cumstances:
The breadth and depth of the segregation problem varies in dif-
ferent states and in different parts of the same state .... As prob-
lems vary in different parts of the country, of necessity the courts'
orders to effectuate a common goal will also be varied.8 0
Entirely aside from the comments of the Eighth Circuit, brief exami-
nation of the actual character of the Office of Education expertise sug-
gests the issue to be at least more complicated than Judge Wisdom
suggests. The civil rights effort at the Office of Education has been in
76. Id.
77. As discussed above there is abundant evidence that HEW vwas motivated by other
reasons than a faith in the superiority of local court orders when writing the blanket
exception into the regulations. A desire simply to benefit from the superiority of court
orders might have explained a rule making the exception discretionary but hardly one
that is mandatory.
78. 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966). While establishing applicable standards the opinion
states "we do not believe the imposition of a set timetable with fixed mathematical
requirements is the necessary answer at this time." Id. at 670. Because Gibson believes
more progress can be made if the circuit court does not impose a "detailed and rigid"
plan he instead allows the school board the "luxury" of being allowed to work out with
the district court a plan especially tailored to its own situation. If it is advisable for a
circuit court not to dictate its own plan to the district court, it is equally inadvisable
to impose Office of Education standards on the district court.
79. 374 F.2d 569, 570 (8th Cir. 1967).
80. Id. at 571. Gibson accordingly declined to order a mandator), choice of schools by
each student each year as is required by Jefferson and the guidelines. The opinion argues
that the Eighth Circuit has advanced beyond the dual attendance zone still a problem
in the Fifth Circuit and that the relatively greater amount of desegregation thereby
achieved allows courts in the Eighth Circuit to give school boards greater discretion.
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the past directed by a division charged with responsibility for the Equal
Educational Opportunity Program (EEOP). In fiscal year 1967 Con-
gress appropriated for HEW's entire civil rights enforcement effort
$3,385,000 and established a personnel ceiling of 278.81 As a result
EEOP in fiscal year 1967 actually employed 65 professional staff mem-
bers, of whom only 43 were assigned to 11 states in the deep South.82
In May 1967 Secretary Gardner announced plans to reorganize
HEW's entire civil rights enforcement program in response to the
advisory directive attached to the House Report on the Appropriation
Bill for fiscal year 1967.83 When finally completed, the plan will abol-
ish EEOP and centralize enforcement efforts for the whole department
in an office directly attached to the Office of the Secretary. While con-
gressional action makes it appear that for fiscal 1968, money will be
appropriated for 88 new positions in the HEW enforcement office, few
if any of the new officials will be assigned to work on school desegre-
gation in the South. 4 Officials estimate that HEW would need 400 staff
members to adequately supervise Southern school desegregation.8 5
In 1965 all but 70 school districts and in 1966 all but 135 eventually
submitted some plan.86 In 1965 Vice-President Humphrey announced
that EEOP could have 30 days to negotiate with the 1,432 school dis-
tricts that still had not submitted acceptable forms by the middle of
81. H.R. ReP. No. 1464, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966). S. REP. No. 1631, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 71 (1966). HEW spread their requests for civil rights funds among 38 separate
accounts. The House consolidated all requests in one budget and directed that the whole
program be also centralized in one office. The supposed efficiencies that the reorganization
would produce justified, according to the House Report, the subsequent cuts.
82. House Judiciary Hearings 28. During 1966 in an effort to enlarge the staff the
agency hired 100 law school students for the summer. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1966, at 29,
col. 1. It is questionable just how helpful to the school districts those hired in such
efforts at temporary staffing could be. Commissioner Howe has said that the summer law
school program was initiated "only because of the load of work that is required in inves.
tigating school districts. . . . I personally hope in another year we can get a larger
proportion of people who have experience in education engaging in this kind of activity,
rather than just legal background." Hearings on Policies and Guidelines for School Deseg.
regation before the House Comm. on Rules, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 52 (1966) [herein-
after cited as House Rules Hearings]. With this in mind HEW hired for the summer of
1967 Southern educators with successful records in their own districts to investigate corn.
pliance in the more recalcitrant areas of the South. N.Y. Times May 12, 1967, at 89, col. 8,
83. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1967, at 1, col. 6. See note 81 supra. The necessary revisions
of the regulation have already been made. 32 Fed. Reg. 14,555 (1967).
84. S. REP. No. 469, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1967). Many of the new staff members
will be assigned to work on enforcing Title VI in other areas of HEW activity than
educatio. Of those assigned to school desegregation indications are that the majority will
be assigned to enforce Title VI in the North. Washington Post, July 8, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
Officials expect the increase in the numbers working on southern school desegregation to
be minor. Interview with Edwin Yourman, Assistant General Counsel of HEW for Edu.
cation, July 31, 1967.
85. House Judiciary Hearings 119.
86. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1966, at 27, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 23, 1966, at 16, col, S.
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July.,7 Almost all of these school districts required personal negotiation.
In the 1966-67 school year it is estimated that the revisions in the guide-
lines required renegotiation in 1,800 cases. s8
Given the size and immensity of the problem HEW in Washington
could obviously never give direction reflecting local difficulties in all
5,146 school districts. Originally the Office of Education had hoped
that at least some of the state departments of education would take the
lead in administering Title VI at the state level in order to prevent the
full burden from falling solely on Washington. The Office planned to
rely solely on the regulations, leaving the state to work out the details
with local school boards.89 At first the state departments of education
sought to avoid their obligation by submitting "dirty" statements of
compliance stipulating that the state would not insist that local school
districts receiving federal money desegregate. 0 Ultimately all capitu-
lated. However, while a few state departments of education, notably
North Carolina in 1965 and Florida in 1966, have taken the lead in
helping school boards desegregate, the majority have been no help.0'
Unaided by the state, the local school boards proved unable to do
the job on their own. Commissioner Howe has said that the Office of
Education "would have been perfectly willing to leave it up to local
school districts" to. carry out their obligations under Title VI and the
regulations. "In practice, however, local school authorities raised so
many questions or made so little progress that the Office of Education
found it necessary to issue guidelines establishing minimum desegre-
gation standards." 92
The burden of directing each school district as it moved toward
desegregation thus fell on the Office of Education alone, whether the
87. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1965, at 47, col. 1.
88. Leeson, Guidelines-a Repeat Performance, oSoum EUC.ATIO.N RE., Oct. 1966,
at 28.
89. Statement of Harold Howe, U.S. Commissioner of Education, in House Rules Hear-
ings 89. The statement of compliance each state educational agency signs pledges that
body to insure compliance with the federal requirements by the local school boards under
its authority and requires the agency to describe the procedure it intends to follow to
inform school districts of their obligation under Title V1.
90. N.Y. Times, March 3, 1965, at 26, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 7, 1965, at 30, col. 3.
In governmentalese a "dirty form" is one that is so extensively amended by the applicant
as to be in all likelihood unacceptable.
91. N.Y. Times., March 7, 1965, at go, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1965, § 4, at 11,
col. 4; House Judiciary Hearings 122.
92. Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L.
REv. 42, 55 (1967), quoting from "The 1966 Desegregation Guidelines: A Situation Re-
port," an address by Harold Howe, US. Commissioner of Education, delivered before the
Alabama State Advisory Committee, Civil Rights Commission, Birmingham, Alabama,
June 11, 1966.
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agency thought it advisable or not. At first it issued only a quarter-page
description of the type of plan that would be acceptable, accompanying
it with a general statement warning that "no tersely stated or vague
plan will be approved" and that "the real question for any district is
the extent to which it wishes to risk disapproval of its plans."3l How.
ever, the local school districts, confessing themselves still unable to
take the initiative and draft acceptable plans, sought further aid from
the Office of Education. The earlier general statement was pronounced
too vague to be of any help, and the argument was made that local
popular acceptance of a plan could not be secured until Washington
put in concrete terms what was required. 4 The result was the guide.
lines, for given the centralization of the task in Washington, the gov-
ernment obviously had no choice but to seek to formulate advice which
could be applied in all cases. It had neither the time, the staff, nor the
detailed knowledge to draft specific advice for each school district that
requested help. The guidelines were originally intended not to have
the force of law but merely to serve as a "reasonable and understand-
able administrative device" to explain to school districts what was ex-
pected of them! 5 The inevitable need, however, for a quick efficient
administrative device meant that they came to be relied on almost
exclusively. But now they are widely viewed by educators as having
the status of law.
The Office of Education thus solved its administrative problems by
extensive reliance on the simplicity of uniformity, Such an approach
has its price. By specifically stating the minimum acceptable stan-
dard, the Office of Education assured that the minimum would
also be the maximum for most school districts. The Office of Education
thereby denied itself the opportunity to require more of Maryland
than of Mississippi.
By opting for a procedure that could be quickly and easily admin-
istered without detailed knowledge of a particular school district, the
Office of Education also had to emphasize in the guidelines those stan-
93. N.Y. Times, March 1, 1965, at 1, col. 3; House judiciary Hearings 122,
94. House Judiciary Hearings 124; N.Y. Times, April 30, 1965, at 1, col. 1.
95. Statement of Harold Howe, U.S. Commissioner of Education, House Rules Hear-
ings 88. Despite the great reliance on the guidelines the President has never signed them.
The Office of Education explains this as in part a desire not to go through tle time-
consuming process of securing presidential signature and in part a desire to avoid the
inflexibility the guidelines would acquire once signed by the President so as to become
a formal regulation. Changes could not be easily effected. House Rules -earings t0. On
top of administrative problems there appear to have been political reasons as well. Sec
p. 362 supra.
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dards which were susceptible to such an approach. The attention paid
faculty desegregation has been dictated partly by the ease with which
the problem may be spotted and the relative speed with which the
situation may be rectified as compared with the question of the assign-
ment of the students themselves.90
The inclusion in the revised guidelines of stated minimum percen-
tages of desegregation that would be accepted resulted from similar
limitations. The Office of Education is too centralized and too under-
staffed to analyze conditions in each school district and to determine
as a result the appropriate speed at which each district should move
toward complete desegregation. It therefore adopted the percentages
with the intent that they serve only as an administrative touchstone
to measure the amount of good faith compliance being made by each
school district.97 Inevitably, however, heavy reliance on the percentages
has aroused much opposition from those who see or want to see in
them a requirement of racial balance.
The Office of Education still hopes to decentralize. The agency has
definite plans for expanding regional offices, especially those in Hous-
ton and Atlanta.98 The feasibility of trying once again to rely on state
agencies to administer the guidelines has also been explored. Such
plans might entail giving money directly to the state government to
enable them to do the work now done by Washington. They might
also involve using Title IV funds to finance non-governmental insti-
tutions staffed with educators able to help state and local officials. 0
The hiring of Southern educators during the summer of 1967 to investi-
gate compliance records also marks a first tentative step towards decen-
96. Telephone interview with Edwin Yourman, Assistant General Counsel of HEW
for Education, Sept. 14, 1967.
97. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1966, at 18, col. -3. Public announcement of the percentages
is intended only to alert school districts as to when they may expect closer scrutiny of
their plans. The Office of Education cannot rely on their percentage standards as proof
of noncompliance when seeking to secure an order from a hearing examiner to terminate
aid. Harold Howe, U.S. Commissioner of Education, quoted in Brief of the United States
for plaintiff and as amicus curiae (unprinted draft) Alabama NAACP State Conference
of Branches v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
98. House Judiciary Hearings 151.
99. Commenting on the advantages of such a plan Howe stated:
I would say this would be a very healthy endeavor when we were able to do it;
that if we could find a way to have states assume this responsibility. The kind of
recognition they have of their local conditions is better than the kind of recognition
we can have from a centralized position in Washington, and I would like to look
for ways to do exactly that,
Statement of Harold Howe, US. Commissioner of Education, House Rules Hearings 71.
Howe points especially to the programs in Florida supported by Title IV money as a
notable example of the success a Title IV program can have. House Judiciary Hearings
151, 155.
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tralizing the enforcement process so that it is run by local officials
working in the South.
These are conscious efforts to conform the administration of
Title VI with the normal pattern of federal participation in edu-
cation which, to the greatest extent possible, leaves the direction
of programs to officials at the local level. They reflect an awareness
that, regardless of the possible size of the staff, efforts to direct the
details of school desegregation from Washington will always suffer from
the disadvantage of centralization arid all such attempts will only repeat
present practices whereby, according to Howe's own admission, the
agency "sends into school districts from Washington people who are
unfamiliar with those school districts, who indeed may not fully realize
some of their problems."' 00
In the light of these facts courts which in framing their orders heav-
ily rely on the guidelines as presently administered may well be over-
estimating the expertise of the Office of Education. Judge Gibson and
the other judges who do not totally reject the value of the agency's
experience but who stress the advantage of leaving courts considerable
freedom to frame orders specially tailored for a school district have a
valid point.
Certainly, in the two problem areas which promise to cause the most
difficulty in future years, district court judges would appear to have
certain advantages over the Office of Education. Teacher desegregation
raises the very difficult problem of tailoring plans to the actual availa-
bility of competent Negro teachers. The solution will vary tremen-
dously from district to district depending on the particular circum-
stances. In Wright v. County School Board,'0' for example, the school
board originally sought to satisfy its requirements by adopting the 1965
Office of Education guidelines, securing Office of Education acceptance,
and then arguing before the court that the school district need go
no further. Judge Butzner in a decision handed down on January
27, 1966, recognized the "great weight" plans approved by the Office
of Education should be given, but ordered more stringent faculty de-
segregation provisions. In May, 1966, the board submitted a second
plan which largely incorporated the new revised guidelines which the
Office of Education had issued since the first court order. Once again
100. Statement of Harold Howe, U.S. Commissioner of Education, House Judiciary
Hearings 154.
101. 252 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1966).
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Judge Butzner held that the particular school district could do better.102
The Judge finally approved in June 1966 a plan which goes beyond
present guideline requirements by establishing a specific timetable for
complete desegregation of the faculty and by establishing specific pro-
cedures for implementing the plan.10 3
Geographic rezoning may become more widely used in the future.'"
If it does, the Office of Education will be at a disadvantage. Review of
a proposed geographic zoning plan requires a detailed, personal knowl-
edge of practically every road in the district. Uniform zoning plans can
not be imposed the same way that the Office of Education under the
free choice plan attempts to detail the appropriate requirements and
procedure without any specific knowledge of the particular district.105
On the other hand, as Judge Gibson conceded in Clark v. Board of
Education, conditions in the Fifth Circuit may dictate relatively greater
deference to Office of Education expertise. Because of the wide dis-
parity in district court decisions in the Fifth Circuit, heavy involve-
ment of the Court of Appeals was probably inevitable. As a circuit
court, and one with an especially heavy caseload of school desegregation
cases, the Fifth Circuit realized that it could not perform as a district
court, appropriately tailoring each plan to each situation. Unable to
function itself as a baseline court in school desegregation cases, and
unable to rely completely on the lower courts, the court in the Jefferson
102. Wright v. County School Bd., Civil No. 4263 (E.D. Va., May 13, 1966), 11 RAcm
REL L. REP. 1319.
103. Wright v. County School Bd., Civil No. 4263 (E.D. Va., June 20, 1966), 11 RAcE
Rr L. REP. 1319.
104. Only twelve per cent of all the plans accepted by the Office of Education in 1965
relied solely on geographic zoning. Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegrc-
gation in the South, 53 VA. L. REv. 42, 65 n.118 (1967). In places where free choice plans
are found not to have worked, however, the guidelines indicate that use of geographic
rezoning is likely to be required. School districts are voluntarily shifting to geographic
plans because of the inconvenience of free choice plans. House Judiciary Hearings 35.
One court has declared that "[i]n the long run it is hardly possible that schools will be
administered on any such haphazard basis." Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
Dist., 355 F.2d 865, 871 (5th Cir. 1966). The Jefferson opinion refers to the "terious short-
comings" of such plans. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 888.
See also Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966); Kemp v. Beasley, 3852 F2d
14 (8th Cir. 1965). The Civil Rights Commission has criticized the willingness of the Office
of Education to accept a free choice plan in every instance. Washington Post. Aug. 8, 1967,
at 1, col. 4. HEW has given all school districts a deadline of 1969 to complete desegregation.
This may further contribute to the number switching to geographic rezoning plans.
Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1967, at M3, col. 1.
105. Seeley has admitted to Congress that geographic rezoning plans cause special
difficulties and that EEOP has not been able to monitor such plans as well as free choice
plans. There are, he explained, "very complicated review problems to determine whether
the lines were drawn for racial reasons or whether they were based on other factors."
Statement of David Seeley, former Director EEOP, House Judiciary Hearings 140. Officials
concede that a change to only geographic zoning "would be extremely difficult in every
respect." Id. 125.
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opinion is simply recognizing that it must relinquish efforts to function
as a normal appellate court and instead act more like an administrative
agency. Having found it necessary to impose standards from above, the
court quite naturally looked for guidance to another centralized govern-
mental body which has already evolved ways to handle very similar
administrative problems.
Even in the Fifth Circuit, however, the comparison is not a perfect
one. Jefferson for all its deference towards Office of Education ex-
pertise and all its desire to frame a decree as close to the guidelines
as possible still attempts in a few places to exploit the greater ability
of a district court to administer a plan flexibly and on an ad hoc basis.
For the moment at least all the details of the faculty desegregation
problem are left to the district court which "should be able to add
specifics to meet the particular situation the case presents." 100 Further-
more, there is no mention in the model decree of any specific percen-
tages of desegregation that a school district must achieve by any given
time; its requirement is simply that by 1967-68 all grades be desegre-
gated.
B. Procedural Inadequacies: The Problem of Enforcement
Closely related to the theme of expertise are judicial lamentations
of inability to cope with school desegregation problems because of the
inevitable limitations of the judicial process. Davis v. Board of School
Commissioners,107 also a Fifth Circuit opinion, first sounded this chord.
The decision, reviewing a district court opinion handed down March .31,
1965, marked the fourth appearance of the same case before the ap-
pellate court. Judge Tuttle points out that this means that the time lag
between the district court order and appellate argument makes it likely
that the district court order will on review be found to be at variance
with present Circuit standards, standards that have inevitably evolved
during the time elapsed before appeal. Judge Tuttle further notes that
because standards are thus continually evolving, the appellate courts
must continually be interpreting and reinterpreting the law applicable
to the cases it reviews. While referring to the "utter impracticability"
of courts moving with the speed necessary in such a rapidly changing
area he implies that the Office of Education can,
It is not inevitable that every judicial system suffer from such a
106. United States v. Jefferson County'Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 893 (5th Cir. 19066).
107. 564 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Sisyphus complex. The circuit court could once a year deliver an opin-
ion containing revised standards for the district courts and tie district
courts could amend all desegregation decrees under their jurisdiction
to assure conformity with new standards. The Jefferson opinion may
foreshadow just such a system, for presumably Office of Education stan-
dards will change from time to time, thereby making a similar change
in the model court decree likely. The real problem is not the difficulty
of informing district courts of the applicable standards, but of assuring
implementation of them once they are announced. The district courts
are apt to lag behind even when applicable standards are clear. The
Davis case itself, which Judge Tuttle cites as an example of the "utter
impracticability" of continued reliance exclusively on the courts, is
really an example of the difficulty the Court of Appeals has had in
simply securing compliance by the local district courts with current
standards. The district court's order was inadequate under any imag-
inable standard.108
Judge Tuttle's argument is not actually a genuine institutional-
competence argument resting on an assertion that inherent limitations
in the judicial system mean an inevitable delay to justice. Rather it
stands primarily for the proposition that with recalcitrant district court
judges, the imposition of a circuit court's will on the operational level
may be a very time consuming process indeed.
The theme of the procedural limitations of the judiciary reappears
in Jefferson. Early in the opinion Wisdom announces: "A national
effort, bringing together Congress, the executive, and the judiciary
may be able to make meaningful the right of Negro children to equal
educational opportunities. The Courts acting alone have failed."'03
Elaborating on the theme of judicial inadequacy, Wisdom refers to
"the slow progress inherent in the judicial adversary process," citing
a committee report that had emphasized the burden court suits place
108. The free choice plan was not to be fully completed until 1969-1970, a period of
7 years. Negroes previously enrolled in one school had a right to transfer to other schools
only if the plan had reached their grade. Otherwise no transfers were allowed for any
reason. No provision at all was made for teacher desegregation; new students entering
the new system for the first time could apply to transfer out of their area school but only
to schools formerly attended exclusively by those of applicant's race; initial assignments
continued to be in fact on a racial basis through use of zoning which v.-as not ostensibly
done on the basis of race but resulted in practice in almost complete segregation. The
circuit court ordered numerous changes so as to conform the court order in most respects
to the guidelines.
109. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 872 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 19566)
(emphasis added).
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on Negro plaintiffs."10 He points to the inability of courts to give ad-
visory opinions; the tendency of the problems to be outside the imme-
diate judicial scope of a particular case; the inappropriateness of the
only means courts have to enforce their orders, contempt proceed-
ings.111 He also reiterates Judge Tuttle's worries about the inevitable
time lag between the Court of Appeals' decision and application by
the District Court.112
Courts have never considered the bar against advisory opinions and
the canons of judicial restraint to be rigid when constitutional con-
siderations demand flexibility. The all-inclusive nature of the Jefferson
opinion itself demonstrates that to a resourceful court such doctrines
need not impede the judiciary from addressing itself with adequate
breadth to the problems before it. The argument has even less force
on the district court level. A court of equity has vast powers in framing
its decree to "go beyond the matters immediately underlying its equi-
table jurisdiction and decide whatever other issues and give whatever
other relief may be necessary under the circumstances.""1 3
The argument that contempt powers are inappropriate as means of
enforcing desegregation is difficult to understand. Wisdom's theory is
that a court should not impose such severe sanctions on those who have
accepted the thankless and difficult task of running schools in areas
where popular feeling is strongly against desegregation and where state
laws designed to avoid desegregation further handicap local efforts to
obey the Constitution. The existence of laws that prevent local school
officials from complying with a court order would seem a fact within
a court's discretion to consider when deciding whether to cite the de-
fendant for contempt. Furthermore, a court faced with such a problem
could attack the problem directly by reviewing the constitutionality
of the state law. The Office of Education faced with a similar problem
may well be powerless.
Judges Wisdom, Tuttle, and Brown are reported to have emphasized
from the bench during rehearing of the Jefferson case that school de-
segregation also imposes too heavy a case load on the judges, making
very clear at the same time that they would like if possible to divert
some of the litigation to the Office of Education."14 If the judges' atti-
110. Id. at 853.
111. Id. at 855.
112. Id. at 860.
113. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
114. Washington Post, March 11, 1967, at 2, col. 6.
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tude towards the Office of Education is actually inspired by a legitimate
fear of overwork and therefore inability to devote sufficient time to
each case, the solution is not to pretend that the administrative agency
can do a better job but to state the problem clearly and hope for larger
judicial appropriations. In fact the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit was expanded from nine to twelve members in 1966, partly so
that the judges could handle with care the large number of desegre-
gation cases.115
Evidence suggests that despite any institutional limitations courts
are still as well-equipped procedurally as the Office of Education to
enforce the desegregation of a particular school district once that school
district has come before the court.
Applying sanctions in the form of termination of aid can be a long
cumbersome process indeed. HEW regulations prescribe an elaborate
procedure that must be followed.110 At the hearing itself the govern-
ment can not rely simply on a school district's failure to observe guide-
line requirements but must affirmatively prove that the officials are not
making a good faith effort to desegregate as rapidly as possible. Many
school districts have not contested the proceedings, but a concerted
effort to thwart the administrative process by all school districts taking
full advantage of all their procedural rights would at least delay the
effectiveness of the enforcement proceedings, given the smallness of
the Office of Education litigation staff.117 There is no comparison with
the speed with which a court may grant a temporary injunction or
115. Washington Post, March 11, 1967, at 2, col. 4. Congress actually voted to make the
Fifth Circuit a 13-man court, making it the largest by four. Wisdom, Political Role of
Federal Courts, 21 Sw. L.J. 411, 413 (1967).
116. 45 C.F.R. § 80-81 (1967), as amended, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,555 (1967). The steps required
include: 1) efforts to secure voluntary compliance and finding by responsible Department
official of inability to secure compliance by voluntary means, 2) notice of opportunity
for a hearing, 3) answer by school district and request for a hearing, 4) service by the
government on the school district of a "Request for Admission of Fact and Genuineness
of Documents," 5) submission of written briefs and hearing for the reception of evidence,
6) hearing examiner's recommendation, 7) filing of exceptions to the recommendations
and answer to the exceptions, 8) oral hearing before reviewing authority at the discretion
of the reviewing authority, 9) holding of reviewing authority, 10) request for reviev by
Secretary, 11) review by Secretary as a matter of discretion where special and important
reasons for such exist, 12) submission of the order to the appropriate congressional
committee. The School Board has 20 days to answer the original notice and request a
hearing, 30 days to appeal the hearing examiner's holding and file supporting briefs, 15
days to appeal the holding of the reviewing authority. An additional 30 da)s must clap-e
after the Secretary makes his final determination and submits it to Congress, before the
order becomes effective.
117. Under the procedures the state of Alabama by vigorously contesting its case man.
aged to delay for 16 months a Secretary's final order cutting off weilfare pa)ments.
Subsequent court appeals have further delayed actual termination of aid.
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move to enforce its own order if not complied with.118 Even after the
administrative process is completed and steps are taken to enforce
Title VI by ending federal aid, desegregation itself has still not been
enforced.
The Office of Education turned to a process known as deferral of
new funds in an effort to overcome the procedural handicaps built
into Tide VI. Despite some misgivings, HEW took the position that
it could, before initiating termination proceedings, merely defer the
making of commitments for new activities. Because the new Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act meant that HEW was making many
commitments for new activities and because the Commissioner could
easily invoke the deferral process after simply securing informal ap-
proval from the Secretary of HEW and from the Justice Department,
the procedure proved helpful.1 9 In the future, however, this device
may become of limited usefulness. In the fall of 1966 the Fountain
amendment was passed.120 This amendment as originally drafted denied
HEW all right to defer funds. As finally passed it implies congressional
approval of the practice where none before existed, but it limits to 60
days the length funds may be deferred without the issuance of a hear-
ing examiner's recommendation of termination of funds. Furthermore,
many of those participating under the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965 are now receiving money only to continue activities
begun in prior years. As a result grants for new activities, and thus the
ability to avoid the procedural limitations attached to Title VI, are
becoming increasingly less common. 21
The Office of Education's efforts to assure observance of the programs
adopted by school officials are also hampered by other institutional
shortcomings. With only a limited staff it is obvious that HEW may
118. The Attorney General's letter of December 1965 in fact predicted that in some
instances sanctions might be more speedily imposed on noncomplying school districts If
the available administrative process was not relied on, but rather efforts were Immedi-
ately concentrated on securing a court order. Letter of the Attorney General, Dec. 27,
1965, House Judiciary Hearings 173-77.
119. In the initial period of compliance efforts during the spring of 1965 some Southern
leaders believed that the whole enforcement process was too cumbersome ever to be
effective and that, consequently, no significant loss of funds need ever result from non.
compliance. The practice of deferral destroyed the argument of some Southerners that
Title VI was too encumbered with procedural safeguards ever to be an effective weapon
against continued school segregation. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1965, at 30, col, 5.
120. Elementary & Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750 § 182,
80 Stat. 1209. For a discussion of some of the legal questions the deferral process can raise,
see Note, School Desegregation and the Office of Education Guidelines, 55 Gao. L.J. 825,
342-44 (1966).
121. It has been estimated that now only ten to twenty per cent of a typical school
district's federal allotment is deferrable. House Judiciary Hearings 65.
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never learn of any but the most notorious violations of the guidelines
until too late. For instance, the government has not been able to check
harassment and intimidation of Negroes seeking to register at a for-
merly white school.2 While HEW may well not have done all it could,
a truly successful campaign to halt such practices would require a staff
far larger than Congress seems likely to approve in the near future.
The Office of Education presently relies heavily on the circumstan-
tial evidence provided by the actual number of transfers accomplished.
Even this monitoring process, however, occurs too long after the fact
to have any immediate effect on progress in the school district. By the
time reports are received from all the school districts and the compli-
cated factual evaluations made, it is often too late for the Office of
Education to require the school board to offer another free choice
period for the same school term.
A court, in contrast, can receive a report from the school district
on the results of the free choice period and react in time to order im-
mediate remedial measures before the opening of school. Furthermore,
because he is close to the problem, because he can rely on the self-
interest of the parties to the suit, and because he can have immediate
recourse to the injunctive powers, a district court judge stands a better
chance of learning about and stopping irregularities before any harm
is done.m3
Neither courts nor administrative agencies such as the Office of
Education have solved the problems of assuring swift, effective enforce-
ment of steps ordered in the name of justice. While Judge Wisdom
and Judge Tuttle argue with some merit that courts are procedurally
ill-equipped for the task of enforcing the law in a particular school
district, their opinions do not fully substantiate their position and fail
122. The Civil Rights Commission, the White House Conference on Civil Rights, and
the NAACP have all accused the Office of Education of failing to take what steps it could
to halt examples of what has been called "the low grade terror" still present in the South.
See U.S. COMMSSION ON CIvIL RIGHTS, TITLE VI-ONE YEAn AFrER (196; Wnslr/E House
CONFERENCE ON CIvIL IIGRHTS, To FtILFL TRSUE RIGIMrs 84-85 (1965); NAACP Lx..,L
DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND & AmcAN FRIENDS SERVICE CoMMTErarF, lro ME o GAr-
NER: REPORT ON THE IMPLE MENTATION OF TIrLE VI oF 1964 IN REcArD To SCHOOL DESEGRE-
GATION 52 (1965); SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL, SCHOOL DEsEcaEATIo 196---THE SLOW
UNDOING 33 (1967).
123. The procedure did not operate at top speed in Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ.,
267 F. Supp. 458 OLD. Ala. 1967). There the decree specifically relied on the Justice
Department to bring to the court's immediate attention any failure to implement fully
the decree. Id. at 486. The Justice Departmnet in fact secured a hearing to complain
that certain school districts had failed to provide adequately for faculty daegregation.
The court ruled that steps to correct any noncompliance could not be ordered until the
beginning of the next school term. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., Civil No. G04-E
(AMD. Ala., Oct. 12, 1967).
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to take into account the difficulties these same problems cause the
Office of Education.
V. The Office of Education, the Courts and the Transfer of Power
Some Fifth Circuit judges are reported to have privately remarked
that they would prefer HEW to take over the school desegregation
field. The judges' remarks suggest that this wish may spring only in
part from a genuine belief in the greater ability of the Office of Edu-
cation to direct the desegregation program. Partly this attitude may
also spring from a desire not to become involved too deeply in local
matters from fear of the consequences to judicial prestige of too close
involvement with such a controversial and politically explosive ques-
tion. Their remarks suggest that there is even a possibility that some
judges wish to escape further involvement partly because they have
lost much of their intellectual, although certainly not their human
interest in the problem.124
The quick readiness of Fifth Circuit opinions to acknowledge the
superiority of the Office of Education should therefore perhaps not be
taken entirely at face value. The private remarks of some of the judges
suggest that the choice of words is not explained entirely by a desire
to weigh impartially the relative institutional competence of the courts
and HEW. Rather they are motivated also by the hope that they will
have the practical effect of relieving the judges of a burden they wish
for various reasons to escape.
Adoption by the court of the guidelines will certainly reduce the
caseload of the judges by discouraging use of the courts as a way of
evading the guidelines. More importantly, the unstinted praise for the
Office of Education is not motivated solely by a desire to establish the
academic point that in the court's view HEW is a better instrument
than the courts to enforce desegregation. It is intended to increase the
prestige of HEW in the South, with the hope that as a consequence
they can operate more effectively and without the need for as great
involvement on the part of the courts.
This judicial tactic of strenuously praising the work of the Office of
Education with the hope that it will indirectly result in a smaller case-
124. Statement of Derrick Bell, Deputy Director, Office of Civil Rights, HEW, August
10, 1966. See also Washington Post, Mar. 11, 1967, at 2, col. 4.
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load for the court is perhaps most noticeable in Jefferson. Judge Wis-
dom argues that Title VI represents the will of Congress that the exec-
utive branch should secure prompt school desegregation and that courts
should support such legislative efforts however possible. The opinion
illustrates well what may be called the attempted transfer of power
from one institution to another.
It is helpful in understanding just what Judge Wisdom is trying to
do in Jefferson to review the factual background of the case. The new
revised guidelines were issued in March, 1966. There followed in the
South what The New York Times called a "fresh wave of resistance"
to the guidelines.2-
The collection of assurances from school boards that they would
observe the new guidelines lagged seriously.-" Though opposition
came from every state, Alabama perhaps produced the most. It not
only refused at that time to cooperate with the Office of Education in
administering Title VI in the state but actively sought to frustrate any
efforts by the federal government to win compliance. The campaign
of opposition ultimately culminated in passage by the state legislature
of an act barring school districts from negotiating with the Office of
Education and nullifying all prior assurances of compliance filed with
Washington.127
It was with the hope of putting down this renewed opposition to the
Offices of Education that the Justice Department at the end of April,
1966, petitioned the court to adopt a model court decree closely resem-
bling the guidelines. During oral argument the school districts, with
more realism than subtlety, charged that the Justice Department's re-
quest was simply an effort to get the Office of Education "off the
hook."'' 8 The Congress of Racial Equality as amicus curiae also made
125. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1966, at 38, coL 1. Senator Ervin (Dem.-N.C.) charged that
the guidelines were illegal as seeking to end racial imbalance. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1966,
at 38, col 4. Others attacked the faculty desegregation provisions. N.Y. Times, April 16,
1966, at 13, col. 3. Further opposition was aroused by the feeling that the Office of Edu-
cation was pushing for more integration in the South than in the North. N.Y. Times,
April 12, 1966, at 18, col. 4.
126. The deadline had to be extended from April 15, 1965, to May 6 when fewer
than one-fourth of the required assurances from the South were received by the original
deadline. N.Y. Times, April 16, 1966, at 13, col. 3. By May 22 there were still twice as
many school districts which had failed to file any plan than the previous year and many
of these filed "dirty" forms. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1966, at 16, col. 3.
127. No. 252, [1966] Ala. Laws Spec. Sess. 372. The Act was held unconstitutional.
Alabama NAACP State Conference of Branches v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp. 346 0.D. Ala.
1967). Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967), describes
the whole history of the state government's role.
128. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1966, at 35, col. 4.
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the argument that court adoption would make it easier for local school
officials to obey the law in the face of popular opposition.12D
It would be strange indeed if in light of this background Jefferson
was intended simply to close the loophole the court orders had afforded
the school districts named in the suit. Wisdom uses this problem to
justify his conclusion that the court standards for the particular school
districts must not be lower than HEW standards. 180 In addition, how-
ever, such a solution to the disparity problem provided a hook on
which to hang a general review and endorsement of the guidelines,
since before endorsing the guidelines in the name of uniformity the
court must establish first whether they are within the demands of the
Constitution and Title VI. By this route Judge Wisdom makes review
of the guidelines an integral part of the case and thus saves his general
support of them from being pure dictum.
While thus using the disparity problem as a means of placing the
guidelines in issue, the endorsement is justified in far broader terms
than necessary to the problem actually before the court. Wisdom de-
clares: "We read Title VI as a congressional mandate for change-
change in pace and method of enforcing desegregation,"'13 and con-
cludes that "[w]hen Congress declares national policy, the duty the
two other coordinate branches owe to the Nation requires that, within
the law, the judiciary and the executive respect and carry out that
policy." 32 The courts should do, he argues, everything they can to
make the efforts of the administrative agency as effective as possible,
and endorsement of its standards is one method. He thus adopts and
greatly expands a theme first raised in Price v. Denison Independent
School District Board of Education, when Judge Brown argued that the
Civil Rights Act "declares the strong legislative policy against racial
discrimination in public education .... ,,33
129. Id.
130. Judge Wisdom reasons in the following words:
Our decisions determine not only (I) the standards schools must comply with under
Brown but also (2) the standards ihese schools must comply with to qualify for federal
financial assistance. Schools automatically qualify for federal aid whenever a final
court order desegregating the school has been entered in the litigation and the school
authorities agree to comply with the order. Because of the second consequence of ourdecisions and because of our duty to cooperate with Congress and with the executive
in enforcing Congressional objectives, strong policy considerations support our holding
that the standards of court-supervised desegregation should not be lower than the
standards of HEW-supervised desegregation.
United States v. Jefferson County IBd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847-48 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3138 (Oct. 9, 1967).
181. Id. at 852.
132. Id. at 856.
133. 384 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 1965).
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For precedent Wisdom cites NLRB cases he finds analogous.1a 4 The
analogy to the labor cases must be considered loose at best. In those
cases the administrative agencies were regulatory ones specifically de-
signed to develop standards to implement a new statute, with court
participation confined generally to limited-scope review of agency
holdings. The question of what constitutes racial discrimination under
the equal protection clause has necessarily been an area dominated by
courts. The Office of Education has not read Title VI as changing this
and authorizing them to develop precedent as does such an agency as
the NLRB. To avoid even appearing to establish standards indepen-
dent of the court, HEW wrote into its regulation the exception for
court orders.
It appears that Judge Wisdom is on stronger though less precise
grounds when he cites the general congressional intent behind the stat-
ute to implement a national decision to pursue vigorously desegregation
efforts through an administrative agency. By interpreting Title VI as
a congressional mandate the opinion's approach manages both to put
the fall judicial weight behind Office of Education efforts and to create
the impression that the court in doing so is simply bowing to the legis-
lative will.
Even this reliance on congressional intent generally could not be
intended as the sole justification of the court's adoption of the guide-
lines, since such reasoning implies that Congress has the power to
amend the Constitution. The thrust of the argument is that passage
of Title VI must affect the court's view as to the speed at which desegre-
gation must proceed to be consistent with the 14th Amendment.
Wisdom implies that until "effective congressional statutory recog-
nition of school desegregation as the law of the land'5 courts could
not set more vigorous standards. The suggestion that courts can not
move to enforce constitutional rights until Congress acts is certainly
novel.
On the purely verbal level, at least, the problem is avoided by the
court's holding that the guidelines "agree with decisions of this circuit
and of the similarly situated Fourth and Eighth Circuits."laO Thus,
Congress is held not to be dictating constitutional standards to the
court at all. However, such a solution if taken at face value negates
184. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 857 (5th Cir. 1965).
135. Id. at 855.
126. Id. at 886. Wisdom also describes the guidelines as "strikingly similar to the
standards the Supreme Court and this Court have established." Id. at 858.
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all the previous talk about the necessity of the courts cooperating with
Congress by adopting equally vigorous standards.
In effect Jefferson is a benediction by the courts of the Office of Edu-
cation's efforts and an anointing of the guidelines with the holy oil of
judicial approval. The inherent weaknesses of the Office of Education,
as well as any real or imagined weaknesses in the judicial system, ex-
plain the exaggerated respect the court accords the administrative
agency. The discussion of relative institutional competence is moti-
vated as much by judicial awareness of its own strengths and its desire
to use it to support the administrative process as by a desire to con-
vince the public that the court is subject to inherent limitations which
justify its effort to be free of all desegregation cases.
The felt need in Jefferson for the court, in effect, to rescue the Office
of Education politically is evidence that courts can compel respect from
Southern opponents of desegregation in a way the latter, as a federal
bureaucracy, never can. The explanation for this must in part result
from a genuine preference by school officials for the local district courts,
a familiar institution, over a remote, impersonal and seemingly inscru-
table federal agency. The Senate debates demonstrated this and the
reactions of local school districts since 1964 confirm it.187
The mere fact that the Office of Education is associated with the
federal government hurts the agency's effectiveness. Inevitably HEW
must act in such a way as to make it appear that the federal government
in Washington is telling a local district how to run its school. Politi-
cally this is an unfortunate image anywhere that "states' rights" slogans
generate support. It is doubly unfortunate when the subject is edu-
cation, one with which the federal government has traditionally sought
to avoid interfering.
The Office of Education must also cope with direct political inter-
ference from Congressmen. As the Office of Education exercises control
over school districts through the power of the purse, so Congress has
the ability to use the power of the purse to influence that agency. It
may limit enforcement funds as it did in 1966 and attach to the appro-
priation report the statement that the funds are not to be used "to
137. Typical of the feeling were the remarks made by Senator Albert Gore, (Dem.-
Tenn.): "[M~y people would prefer to submit to a [flederal judge whom they know, and
who has some knowledge of the circumstances that prevail, their plan for school desegre-
gation, for approval or disapproval." 110 CONG. REc. 14,439 (1964). To Gore following tie
orders of a federal district judge is better than being ruled by "some crusader from afar"
or from any source with which the local people are not as well acquainted. 110 CoN0,
Rac. 14,434 (1964).
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go about the country harassing people," wording which left no doubt
as to the meaning to be attached to the budget cut or the possibility
of even greater ones in the future.n s Congress may alter procedures
as it did by passing the Fountain Amendment or attempt to undercut
the Office of Education's prestige by holding hearings to criticize Mr.
Howe for "arbitrary," "unreasonable" and "irresponsible" acts.1 9
The political disadvantages the Office of Education suffers from
would not be unique to a federal agency or especially damaging
were it not for the fact that the whole effort to desegregate schools
in the South requires direct cooperation from a segment of its
population which is painfully susceptible to political pressures. Most
Southern state superintendents of education and most state boards of
education are politically elected.140 While the practice on the local
level varies tremendously throughout the South, it is fair to say that
in many school districts as well the board of education members are
popularly elected. Elected officials are reluctant to take any action that
might be interpreted as voluntarily agreeing to desegregate. A court
order is useful in that it leaves the official no choice and a perfect
excuse. Compliance with Office of Education guidelines in contrast
means taking action when such is required only by the more subtle
and indirect coercion of the power of the purse.' 4'
The Office of Education's ability to hurdle these political barriers
to effective operation in the South is problematical. To date its most
effective device for rallying public support behind voluntary compli-
ance has been the adoption of the deferral process; but widespread use
of the process may no longer be practical. The plan to place the enforce-
ment program directly in the Office of the Secretary may perhaps help
to give spokesmen for the program added political weight in Congress.
The government is also exploring other possible ways to try to alleviate
the situation.14 In the meantime the problem remains.
138. S. REP. No. 1631, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1966).
139. House Rules Hearings 98.
140. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1965, at 30, col. 5.
141. Typical of the problem is the attitude of the State Board of Education in
Louisiana. The New York Times quoted Governor John McKeithen as saying it would
be "political suicide" for any elected state school board member to vote for desegregation.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1965, at 30, col. 4. The Southern Regional Council has concluded
succinctly that "(a] superintendent wishing to comply with the law is a lonely individual
in the South. His predicament is made more painful by the fact that he is often under
direct pressure from his constituents.' SournHRN Razco,.. CouNcti, ScHooL DSmCA-
TION 1966: TnE SLOW UNDOiNG 35-36 (1967).
142. HEW, for instance, has experimented with actually holding compliance bearings
in the state where the school district is located. To date such hearings have been con-
ducted in Jackson, Aliss., Columbia, S. C., and Atlanta, Ga. The hope is that such hear-
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The Office of Education's position is further weakened by its reluc-
tance to fully exploit such sources of political power presently available
to it as the President. While the President has not hesitated to pub-
licly support the guidelines when under political attack,143 FIEW de-
cided not to ask the President to sign them as a regulation for fear
of unduly risking the President's political prestige. 14 4 HEW feared that
if the guidelines met successful opposition the President might be po-
litically embarrassed by any modification forced on the Office of Edu-
cation by political pressure from the South. As a consequence, Southern
politicians have argued that the standards represent only the work of
an "irresponsible" federal bureaucracy rather than the will of a politi-
cally responsible official. The decision has not only weakened the gov-
ernment's case politically but continues to raise legal questions whether
the use of unsigned guidelines violates Title VI, a point Southerners
have been quick to exploit.
Given the relative inability of the Office of Education to generate
effective political strength, either by itself or with the help of the
President, it is not surprising that the agency turned to the courts for
help. It may be that Jefferson will be at least partially successful in
overcoming some of the opposition to the Office of Education in the
South.
A complex relationship between different institutions emerges. Local
school officials seek to avoid responsibility for having to observe guide-
line standards by arguing that the courts require it. Arguing that
merely the Office of Education requires it is not as effective. Similarly
the Office of Education seeks to strengthen its position in the South
by arguing that they have both the general support of the courts and
now, after Jefferson, their specific endorsement. At the same time they
avoid any possibility of a politically damaging confrontation with the
courts by writing an exception in their regulations for court orders.
The courts wish to limit their involvement with the problem for sev-
ings 1illi inform the public and emphasize the necessity of compliance and the conse-
quences of a refusal to do so. As the process of decentralization continues and as the
details can be worked out, it is hoped local hearings may become more common. Tale-
phone ineterview with Edwin Yourman, Assistant General Counsel of HEW for Education,
Sept. 12, 1967.
143. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1966, at 1, col. 4; President's news conference,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1966, at 2, col. 4; Reply of the President to Senator Russell's Letter
of May 2, 1966, in SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL, SCIOOL DESEGREGATiON 1966: THE StoW
UNDOING 15.
144. Interview with Edwin Yourman. Assistant General Counsel of HEW for Edn.
cation, Jan. 18, 1967. See also House Rules Hearings 40.
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eral reasons. Their response has been to enthusiastically endorse the
guidelines, though, in part, to draw on the political strength of the
United States Congress to justify their stance rather than to expend
their own prestige too openly. Their endorsement of the guidelines
helps to shift future responsibility back to the federal executive and
hopefully reduces their own future involvement. The circle is thus
squared. Everybody benefits by the process and no one involved on
either side of the controversy must pay by having to publicly assume
responsibility for adoption of the guidelines and the desegregation
that results.
The catalyst that sparked this whole process was the Office of Edu-
cation's decision to accept court orders in place of its own compli-
ance requirements. Without this exception the school officials could not
have tried to use the courts as a way to avoid the guidelines require-
ments and the pattern described above would not thereby have de-
veloped. Certainly, without the exception for court orders, an excuse
for Jefferson would have been harder to find and a rational opinion
harder to write. In the end, then, the regulatory exception for court
orders which has caused so much difficulty to the Office of Education
becomes, ironically, a positive asset. As a result of the exception the
enforcement efforts of the courts and the Office of Education are as
a whole greater than the sum of their parts.
Obviously, though, Jefferson will not prove the complete answer.
Lee v. Macon County Board of Education,141; demonstrates that political
opposition to the Office of Education enforcement of the guidelines can
not always be defeated by any such subtle interplay between the courts
and the administrative agency. In this case, a three-judge federal court
granted the government's request for a statewide injunction ordering
integration in 99 school districts in Alabama not previously under a
court order. The court held that active interference by the state gov-
ernment with efforts of local school districts to comply with Office of
Education requirements made necessary the unprecedented breadth
of its order. The decision specifies that all 99 school districts are to
adopt free choice plans following a model plan adopted from the
Jefferson opinion.
The opinion in effects puts the Office of Education out of business
in the State of Alabama since henceforth every school district in that
state will be subject to a court order. Even the approximately 40
145. 267 F. Supp. 458 OM.D. Ala. 1967).
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school districts which had submitted compliance forms that the govern-
ment had accepted were included in the court order.
Consequently, it will never be possible to tell whether the Jefferson
opinion could have succeeded in giving the Office of Education suf-
ficient stature to reverse opposition to the guidelines in the state that
in the past had most vehemently opposed HEW efforts. Alabama, of
course, may be a special situation in which even the courts acting alone
can not command obedience. Nevertheless, it remains clear that the
courts stand a better chance of securing desegregation in Alabama
than did the Office of Education. In deciding that the situation in
Alabama required the active intervention of the courts on a statewide
basis the court implicitly rejects all the prior Fifth Circuit dicta stress-
ing both the institutional limitations of the judicial process and the
superiority of administrative enforcement of the law. It makes clear
that despite the tenor of some of the language in Fifth Circuit Court
opinions, the courts are not withdrawing from the problems of day-to-
day enforcement of the 14th Amendment.
The allocation of responsibilities between the courts and the admin-
istrative agency arrived at in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education
completely reverses the roles originally envisioned for courts and the
Office of Education under Title VI. Originally HEW thought that the
courts would establish the standards and the government, through Title
VI, would be responsible for administering them on a mass basis. In
the Alabama opinion the courts are the institution administering the
law on a mass basis and the Office of Education is at best serving in an
advisory role helping the courts determine the applicable standards
and then helping, in tandem with the Justice Department, to advise
the courts on the adequacy of the desegregation plans submitted by the
school districts.
Conclusion
Both United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education and Lee
v. Macon County Board of Education are judicial acknowledgements
of the inability of the administrative process to desegregate Southern
schools when acting alone. Both decisions are massive reaffirmations of
the courts' concern with the problem. The only question is whether the
help the courts give the Office of Education in such cases as the Jef-
ferson opinion will suffice or whether the solution of the court in the
Alabama case will in turn be repeated in each Southern state until the
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Office of Education is stripped of any direct role in continuing efforts
to enforce desegregation in the South.140
For ten years supporters of desegregation contended that the courts
were unable to enforce the law and that the only way desegregation
could be achieved was if the political powers of government were in-
voked in the form of a federal statute delegating to the executive
branch sufficient authority to enforce the law. Now the pendulum
should begin to swing back and there should be a growing awareness
that the courts cannot and should not retire from the field. At the least
a close partnership between the judiciary and the executive is required.
146. The court in Lee held that the state had an affirmative duty to insure that local
school boards had adopted successful desegregation plans. 267 F. Supp. at 478. While the
Alabama state government has perhaps been more open than other states in its opposition
to school desegregation, the duty of the state to direct desegregation efforts presumably
exists whether or not the state government has in its past openly exerted Its influence
against desegregation. Since none of the states have taken as active a role as they might
in encouraging desegregation the rationale of Lee could be applicable to all the states in
the South. See p. 545 supra.
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